The Washington Monthly

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

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How to Spot a Spook

by John Marks

Several times in the last few years, this magazine has suggested that the quickest single way to improve the conduct of American foreign policy would be to get rid of the covert agents and clandestine operators in the CIA. In the spirit of practicing what we preach, we present the following article, which tells how to identify a great number of the Agency's "secret" operators. Our purpose is to hasten the day when our intelligence organizations concentrate on their real work—collecting and analyzing information from open sources—and to cut the ground away from the James Bonds and the Gordon Liddys of the world before they get us all in any more trouble.

Both the Soviet and American intelligence establishments seem to share the obsession that the other side is always trying to bug them. Since the other side is, in fact, usually trying, our technicians and their technicians are constantly sweeping military installations and embassies to make sure no enemy, real or imagined, has succeeded. One night about ten years ago, a State Department security officer, prowling through the American embassy in Santiago, Chile, in search of communist microphones, found a listening device carefully hidden in the office of a senior "political officer." The security man, along with everyone else in the embassy, knew that this particular "political officer" was actually the Central Intelligence Agency's "station chief," or principal operative in Chile. Bugging his office would have indeed been a major coup for the opposition. Triumphantly, the security man ripped the microphone out of the wall—only to discover later that it had been installed by the CIA station chief himself.

The reason the CIA office was located in the embassy—as it is in most of the other countries in the world—is that by presidential order the State Department is responsible for hiding and housing the CIA. Like the intelligence services of most other countries, the CIA has been unwilling to set up foreign offices under its own name, so American embassies—and, less frequently, military bases—provide the needed cover. State confers respectability on the Agency's operatives, dressing them up with the same titles and calling cards that give legitimate diplomats entree into foreign government circles. Protected by diplomatic immunity, the operatives recruit local officials as CIA agents to supply secret intelligence and, especially in the Third World, to help in the Agency's manipulation of a country's internal affairs.

The CIA moves its men off the diplomatic lists only in Germany, Japan, and other countries where large numbers of American soldiers are

John Marks is an associate of the Center for National Security Studies and co-author of The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence.

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stationed. In those countries, the CIA's command post is still in the U.S. embassy, but most of the CIA personnel are under military cover. With nearly 500,000 U.S. troops scattered around the world, the CIA "units" buried among them do not attract undue attention.

In contrast, it is difficult for the CIA to dwell inconspicuously within the American diplomatic corps, since more than a quarter of the 5,435 employees who purportedly work for State overseas are actually with the CIA. In places such as Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, and Guyana, where the Agency has special interests and projects, there are about as many CIA operatives under cover of substantive embassy jobs as there are legitimate State employees. The CIA also places smaller contingents in the ranks of other U.S. government agencies which operate overseas, particularly AID's police training program in Latin America.

What is surprising is that the CIA even bothers to camouflage its agents, since they are still easily identifiable. Let us see why the embassy cover is so transparent:

■The CIA usually has a separate set of offices in the embassy, often with an exotic-looking cipher lock on the outside door. In Madrid, for example, a State Department source reports that the Agency occupied the whole sixth floor of the embassy. About 30 people worked there; half were disguised as "Air Force personnel" and half as State "political officers." The source says that all the local Spanish employees knew who worked on what floor of the embassy and that visitors could figure out the same thing.

■CIA personnel usually stick together. When they go to lunch or to a cocktail party or meet a plane from Washington, they are much more likely to go with each other than with legitimate diplomats. Once you have identified one, you can quickly figure out the rest.

■The CIA has a different health insurance plan from the State Department. The premium records, which are unclassified and usually available to local employees, are a dead giveaway.

■The Agency operative is taught early in training that loud background sounds interfere with bugging. You can be pretty sure the CIA man in the embassy is the one who leaves his radio on all the time.

■Ironically, despite the State Department's total refusal to comment on anything concerning the CIA, the Department regularly publishes two documents, the *Foreign Service List* and the *Biographic Register*, which, when cross-checked, yield the names of most CIA operatives under embassy cover. Here is how it works:

America's real diplomats have insisted on one thing in dealing with the CIA: that the corps of Foreign Service Officers (FSO) remain pure. Although there are rumors of exceptions, CIA personnel abroad are always given the cover rank of Foreign Service Reserve (FSR) or Staff (FSS) officers—not FSO. Of course, there are some legitimate officials from the State Department, AID, and USIA who hold FSR and FSS ratings, so care must be taken to avoid confusing these people with the spooks.

To winnow out the spooks, you start by looking up in the *Foreign Service List* the country in question, for example, China. The letters in the third column from the left signify the man or woman's personnel status and the number denotes his or her rank. On the China list, David Bruce is an "R-1," or Reserve Officer of class 1, the highest rank. John Holdridge is a regular Foreign Service Officer (FSO) of the same grade, and secretary Barbara Brooks is a Staff Officer, class 4.

PEKING (U.S. LIAISON OFFICE) (LO)

Bruce David K E	chief USLO	R-1	5-73
Holdridge John H	dep chief USLO	O-1	5-73
Jenkins Alfred Les	dep chief USLO	R-1	
Brooks Barbara A	sec	S-4	5-73
McKinley Brunson	spec asst	O-6	5-73
Zaelit Lucille	sec	S-5	5-73
Anderson Donald M	pol off	O-4	6-73

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Hunt Janice E	sec	S-8	12-73
Lilley James R	pol off	R-3	
Pascoe B Lynn	pol off	0-5	7-73
Horowitz Herbert Eugene	econ/cml off	0-3	6-73
Morin Annabelle C	sec	S-7	7-73
Rope William Frederick	econ/cml off	0-4	4-73
Blackburn Robert R Jr	adm off	0-3	4-73
Herrera Delia L	sec	S-6	5-73
Lambert William F	coms/rec off	R-6	2-74
Lucas Robert T	coms/rec off	S-2	7-73
Morin Emile F	gen ser off	0-6	3-72
Peterson Robert D	coms/rec off	R-6	7-73
Riley Albert D	coms/rec off	S-5	5-73

Now Holdridge almost certainly can be ruled out as an operative, simply because he is an FSO. Not much can be told one way or the other about FSS Brooks because, as is the case with most secretaries, the State Department does not publish much information about her. David Bruce might be suspect because of his "R" status, but a quick glance at the *Biographic Register*, which gives a brief curriculum vitae of all State Department personnel, shows him to be one of the high-level political appointees who have "R" status because they are not members of the regular Foreign Service. Similarly, the *Register* report on FSR Jenkins shows that he had a long career as an FSO before taking on the State Department's special assignment in Peking as an FSR:

Bruce, David KE–b Md 2/21/98, m (Evangeline Bell). Princeton U AB 19. Mem Md bar. US Army 17-19, 42-45 col overseas. PRIV EXPER priv law practice 21-26, mem State legis 24-26, 39-42, with bank-priv bus 28-40, chief rep Am Red Cross (England) 40-41. GOVT EXPER with Off Strategic Sers 41-45, asst sec of Com 47-48. ECA Paris R-1 chief of mission 5/48. STATE AEP to France 5/49. Dept under sec of state 2/52, consult to sec of state 1/53. Paris R-1 pol off-US observer to Interim Comm of EDC, also US rep to European Coal-Steel Community (Luxembourg) 2/53. Dept consult to sec of state 1/55. Bonn AEP to Germany 3/57-11/59. London AEP to Great Britian 2/61-3/69. Dept R-1 pers rep of Pres with pers rank amb to hd US del at Paris meetings on Viet-Nam 7/70-4/71. Peking chief liaison off 3/73.

Jenkins, Alfred leSesne–b Ga 9/14/16, m. Emory U AB 38, Duke U MA 46. US Army 42-46 1st lt. PRIV EXPER prin-supt pub schs 40-42. STATE Dept FSO unclass 6/46. Peiping Chin lang-area trainee 9/46, O-6 11/46. Tientsin pol off 7/48, O-5 4/49. Hong Kong chief pol sect 7/49. Taipei pol off 7/50, O-4 6/51. Dept 3/52. O-3 9/54. Jidda couns, dep chief mission 2/55. Dept det Nat War Coll 8/57, O-2 2/58, dep dir Off of SE Asian Aff 6/58, reg plan ad Bu of Far E Aff 8/59. Stockholm couns, dep chief mission 10/61, cons gen 3/62, O-1 3/63. Dept FS insp 8/65, det Nat Security Counc 7/66, FS insp 1/69, dir Off of Asian Communist Aff 7/70, superior honor award 71, dir for People's Rep of China, Mongolia, Hong Kong-Macao aff 2/73. Peking dep chief liaison off 4/73. Lang Ger. (w—Martha Lippiatt).

Note that there are no gaping holes in their career records, nor did either of these men serve long tours with nameless Pentagon agencies, nor did they regularly change their status from "R" to "S" to "GS" (civil service).

Now, for purposes of comparison, examine the record of the CIA's man in Peking, a "political officer" named James R. Lilley:

Lilley, James R–b China Am parents 1/15/28, m. Yale U BA 51. US Army 46-47. GOVT EXPER anal Dept of Army 51-58. STATE Manila R-6 7/58. Dept 10/60. Phnom Penh 9/61, R-5 3/63. Bangkok 4/63. Dept 8/64. Vientiane pol off 6/65, R-4 5/66, S-2 4/68. Hong Kong 5/68, R-4 5/69. Dept 7/70, GS-15 fgn aff off 4/71, R-4 det lang trng FSI 7/72-4/73. Lang Fr, Rom. (w—Sally Booth).

The *Foreign Service List* provides another clue, in the form of diplomats' official assignments. Of all the jobs real State Department representatives perform, political reporting is generally considered to be the most important. Although *genuine* FSRs frequently hold administrative and consular slots, they are almost never given the important political jobs. So where an FSR *does* appear in the listing with a political job, it is most likely that the CIA is using the position for cover. There is an exception to this rule: a comparatively few minority-group members who have been brought into the Foreign Service as Reserve Officers under a special program. They are found exclusively in the junior ranks, and their biographic data is complete in the way the CIA people's is not.

Finally there is another almost certain tip-off. If an agent is listed in the *Biographic Register* as having been an "analyst" for the Department of the Army (or Navy or Air Force), you can bet that he or she is really working for the CIA. A search of

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hundreds of names found no legitimate State Department personnel listed as ever having held such a job.

In an embassy like the one in Santo Domingo, the spooks in the political section outnumber the real FSOs by at least seven to three:

Political Section

Beyer Joel H	pol off	R-5	7-72
Brugger Frederick A	pol off	R-7	9-72
Bumpus James N	pol off	O-4	7-72
Chafin Gary E	pol off	O-6	8-73
Clayton Thomas A	pol off	R-3	5-71
Dwiggins Joan H	pol off	R-7	3-72
Fambrini Robert L	pol off	S-2	6-73
Greig David N Jr	pol off	R-5	8-71
Guell Janet E	sec	S-8	12-73
Markoff Stephanie M	sec	S-8	6-73
Merriam Geraldine C	clk-typist	S-9	2-73
Mooney Robert C	pol off	R-6	8-72
Morris Margaret A	clk-typist	S10	12-73
Pascoe Dorothy L	sec	S-7	2-74
Ryan Dondald G	pol off	R-8	8-73
Williams Albert N	pol off	O-3	7-73

While Dondald Ryan is an "R" in the political section, there is not sufficent data published about him to verify his status.

It was by studying these documents that I learned that the CIA has sent an operative to Peking. For confirmation, I called the State Department's ranking China expert, Acting Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Hummel. After I identified myself as a reporter working on a magazine article and explained where I had gotten my information, Hummel shouted, "I know what you're up to and I don't want to contribute. Thank you very much!" and slammed down the phone.

Another State official confirmed that the decision to send an operative to Peking was made in early 1973, but declared that making public the operative's existence could "jeopardize" Chinese-American relations. Neither this official nor any of his colleagues seemed willing to consider the notion that the U.S. government was under no obligation to assign a CIA man there—or anywhere else for that matter. The first American mission to China since 1949 certainly could have been staffed exclusively with real diplomats if concern about damaging relations were so high. To

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have excluded the Agency from Peking, however, would have gone against a basic axiom of the post-World War II foreign policy establishment: the CIA follows the flag into American embassies.

The Chinese government is presumably clever enough to identify the operative by sifting through the public documents available. In fact his arrival may well have been cleared with the Chinese, who probably wanted reciprocal privileges for their secret service in Washington. Such are the arrangements the world's spooks are so fond of working out with each other—the Soviet KGB and the CIA even exchange names of intelligence analysts assigned to the other's capital.

Sacrificing 'State'

Much to the alarm of a few high State Department officials, the proportion of CIA to State personnel abroad has been steadily rising in recent years. The precise figures are zealously guarded, but several State sources confirm the trend. They cite as the main reason for this tilt toward the CIA a series of government-wide cutbacks that have hit State proportionately harder than the CIA. What troubles State is not, as one career diplomat put it, "the principle" that State should provide the CIA with cover. That is unquestioned, he says. Rather, most legitimate diplomats do not like being a minority within their own profession or having the rest of the world confuse them with the CIA's dirty tricksters. They generally regard themselves as working at a higher calling.

While the State Department has been comparatively honest in accepting the personnel cuts ordered by the Johnson and Nixon administrations, two sources familiar with the CIA budget report that the Agency has done everything possible to escape the reductions. Traditionally, when outsiders—even Presidents—have tried to meddle with the Agency's personnel allotment, the CIA has resisted on "national security" grounds. And

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when that argument failed, the CIA resorted to bureaucratic ruses: cutting out a job and then replacing the person eliminated with a "contract" or "local" employee, who would not show up on the personnel roster; or sending home a clandestine support officer—a specialist in things like renting "safe houses," "laundering" money, and installing phone taps—and then having the same work done by experts sent out from Washington on "temporary duty."

Just this spring, the State Department took official, if secret, notice of its declining presence overseas compared to the CIA when Secretary Henry Kissinger authorized a high-level study of State-CIA staffing. The Department's top administrator, L. Dean Brown, who had urged the study be made in the first place, gave the job to Malcolm Toon, a career diplomat serving as U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia. Toon returned to Washington to compile the top-secret report.

Asking not to be named and refusing to provide the specific figures, a source close to Kissinger says that Toon's report calls for a substantial reduction in the number of CIA operatives abroad under State cover. The source adds that Kissinger has not made up his mind on the issue.

Kissinger has always acted very carefully where the CIA is concerned. One of his former aides notes that the Secretary has regularly treated the Agency with great deference at government meetings although he has often been privately scornful of it afterwards. In any case, Kissinger is unquestionably a believer in the need for the CIA to intervene covertly in other countries' internal affairs—he was the prime mover behind the Agency's work against Salvador Allende in Chile. The question of how much cover State should provide the CIA, however, is chiefly a bureaucratic one, and is not basic to Kissinger's foreign policy. The Secretary therefore will probably not take a definite position until he sees how much opposition the CIA will be able to stir up in the White House and in the congressional subcommittees that supposedly oversee the Agency.

The CIA has lost no time in launching its counteroffensive. At a July 19 off-the-record session with key Democratic congressional aides, Carl Duckett, the CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, complained about the reductions recommended by the Toon report. According to a source who was present, Duckett said that even without further embassy cuts, the CIA now doesn't have enough people overseas.

CIA officials must be especially concerned about Toon's recommendations, since in countries where there are no U.S. military bases, the only alternative to embassy cover is "deep," or non-official, cover. American corporations operating overseas have long cooperated in making jobs available to the CIA and would probably continue to do so. Also, the Agency would probably have to make

> Not only does the State Department provide the CIA with cover, but the Senate—and especially its Foreign Relations Committee—encourages the current practice of sending over 25 per cent of our "diplomatic" corps abroad under false pretenses. Every year the Foreign Relations Committee routinely approves and sends to the full Senate for its advice and consent lists of "Foreign Service Reserve Officers to be consular officers and secretaries in the Diplomatic Service of the United States of America." In 1973, of the 121 names submitted by the State Department, more than 70 were CIA operatives. According to a knowledgeable source, the committee is informally told the number of CIA people on the lists but "not who they are." No senator in memory has publicly objected to being an accomplice to this cover-building for the CIA.

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more use of smaller firms where fewer people would know of the clandestine connection. Two examples of this type are:

* Robert Mullen and Company, the Washington-based public relations concern for which E. Howard Hunt worked after he left the CIA and before the break-in at Democratic National Headquarters. Mullen provided CIA operatives with cover in Stockholm, Mexico City, and Singapore, and in 1971 set up a subsidiary in cooperation with the CIA called Interprogres, Ltd. According to a secret Agency document released with the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment evidence, "At least two [CIA] overseas assets have tangential tasks of promoting the acceptance of this company as a Mullen subsidiary."

* Psychological Assessment Associates, Inc., a Washington psychological consulting firm specializing in behavioral research and analysis. By the admission of its president John Gittinger, most of the company's business since it was founded in 1957 by three ex-CIA psychologists has come from Agency contracts. The firm had two "representatives" in Hong Kong, at least until June of this year.

Unless their cover is blown, companies of this sort and operatives who work for them cannot be linked to the U.S. government. But the Agency has learned over the years that it is much more difficult and expensive to set up an operative as a businessman (or as a missionary or newsman) than to put him in an embassy. As a "private" citizen, the operative is not automatically exposed to the host country's key officials and to foreign diplomats, nor does he have direct access to the CIA communications and support facilities which are normally housed in embassies. Moreover, as an ex-CIA official explains, "The deep cover guy has no mobility. He doesn't have the right passport. He is subject to local laws and has to pay local taxes. If you try to put him in an influential business job, you've got to go through all the arrangements with the company."

Who Needs Gumshoes?

Everything argues for having the intelligence agent in the embassy—everything, that is except the need to keep his existence secret. The question then becomes whether it is really that important to keep his existence secret—which, in turn, depends on how important his clandestine activities are.

Could any rational person, after surveying the history of the last 20 years, from Guatemala to Cuba to Vietnam—and now Chile—contend that the CIA's clandestine activities have yielded anything but a steady stream of disaster? The time has come to abolish them. Most of the military and economic intelligence we need we can get from our satellites and sensors (which already provide nearly all our information about Russia's nuclear weaponry) and from reading the newspapers and the superabundant files of open reports. As for political intelligence—which is actually an assessment of the intentions of foreign leaders—we don't really need this kind of information from Third World countries unless we intend to muck about in their internal affairs. With the Soviet Union or China—countries powerful enough to really threaten our national security—timely political intelligence could be a great help. But for the past 25 years we have relied on open sources and machine-collected intelligence because our agents have proven incapable of penetrating these closed societies. There is not enough practical benefit gained from the CIA's espionage activities to compensate for our nation's moral and legal liability in maintaining thousands of highly trained bribers, subverters, and burglars overseas as "representatives" of our government. The problem of getting good, accurate, reliable information from abroad is a complicated one, beyond the scope of this article, but, to paraphrase Mae West, covert has nothing to do with it. ■

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Why Leave it to Earl?

by Roger Morris and Hal Sheets

"Good U. S. economic policy is good U. S. foreign policy."
—Richard M. Nixon, 1969

"Sell, sell, sell."
—Secretary of Agriculture
Earl L. Butz, 1974

"Unlike food prices, the high cost of oil is not the result of economic factors, of an actual shortage of capacity, or of the free play of supply and demand. Rather it is caused by deliberate decisions to restrict production and maintain an artificial price level."
—Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger, 1974.

Roger Morris and Hal Sheets are co-authors of Disaster in the Desert. *This article was written without any institutional sponsorship.*

One of the few consolations about soaring food prices—one of the two major causes of our present inflation—has been the sense of their inevitability. We can blame the unions for rising wages and blame the Arabs and the oil companies for the price of oil, but only God can take the rap for crop failure, drought, and early frost. That is what Henry Kissinger meant in the quotation above: we must be patient as we pay our penance at the supermarket, and the hungry people of the world must realize that next year's famines simply could not be prevented.

That, at least, is the official wisdom. While the steady growth of population and the generally miserable growing seasons of the last few years give it a germ of truth, it leaves out a crucial element: the U. S. Department of Agriculture, which in its cupidity and its ignorance has done

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

as much to hurt our food supply as any angry God imaginable. The details of the Department's methods are confusing, and often bizarre: who would have suspected that one $35,000 computer would affect the price we pay for bread? It is a commentary on our times that U. S. food policy, perhaps the most urgent problem facing us, has been left hostage to economic practices out of the 19th century and to minds that would be ill-equipped for any era.

President Ford's 11th-hour intervention in October to stop another massive Russian wheat deal from sneaking through and the subsequent congressional investigation may begin to get at the tangled economics and politics of food. But as Kissinger and the American delegation depart for the World Food Conference in Rome this month, armed with dramatic pledges of U. S. assistance to stem international famine, they leave behind them a policy mess in food that stands to make a mockery of the best-intentioned diplomacy.

What about the "natural causes" explanation of the world food problem? 1972 was undeniably a bad crop year. A winter kill followed by a dry summer in Russia, droughts in Argentina and Australia, typhoons in the Philippines, an inadequate monsoon in India—all combined to reduce world grain production by more than three per cent during 1972. The important fact about these developments as far as the subsequent U. S. decisions are concerned, is that each of the crop failures was reported by U. S. embassies to the Departments of State and Agriculture, and some—like the Soviet winter wheat calamity—were predicted early in the year. When combined with the portentous new trends bearing on international grain sup-

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plies—drops in the grain reserves of the principal exporting countries, mounting pressure from burgeoning population growth and rising worldwide affluence, Russia's change from a net exporter of grain to a net importer, the decline in the world fish catch, and finally, the all too clear prospect of mass famines in West Africa and Bangladesh, all of which, in addition to the low crop, were known within the U. S. government in 1972—the evidence pointed to one clear conclusion: there would be unprecedented demands, much of them humanitarian, on the U. S. grain supply, with consequences reaching far into the future for both the domestic and international economies.

The evidence was on hand. It was simply ignored.

There is no other explanation for the Department of Agriculture's decision in 1972 to withhold from production some 62 million acres of farmland—about equal to the total farmland in the United Kingdom. The nearly $4 billion paid to farmers to idle that land was almost double the previous annual payment. Then in July and August, following negotiations by Kissinger in Moscow, the Soviet Union purchased for $1.1 billion 18 million tons of American grain. The total Soviet grain purchase worldwide was 28 million tons.

The enormous sales to the Russians produced an immediate shock on the world grain market. Wheat prices climbed 300 per cent, from less than $60 a ton to more than $180 a ton, in a year's time. As the prices rocketed and the dimensions of the Soviet purchases became apparent, panic seized the grain-purchasing nations. Beginning in August and continuing into late 1972, orders poured in from Europe and Japan. The initial buyers benefited from the Agriculture Department's artificially stabilized world price of $60 a ton. But the subsidies were removed in September, and frantic buying continued in an attempt to get what wheat, corn, or soybeans were left. Finally, in mid-February 1973 came another predictable event: when American stockpiles were nearly exhausted, the dollar was devalued. The price of wheat was suddenly 15 per cent lower in yen, Japanese orders surged, eventually to total some 17 million tons worldwide, most of it purchased from the U.S.

When it was over, the grain buying orgy had raised U.S. agricultural exports by nearly $5 billion, more than 60 per cent over 1971, but this cost to American taxpayers (since the U. S. government subsidized one third of the purchase) was enormous, and the cost in higher grocery store prices is probably incalculable. For the poor countries, the Soviet purchase meant drastically reduced shipments of food in humanitarian assistance programs, the size of which are determined by U. S. food surpluses.

Why had the Administration failed to heed the numerous indicators of tight food supply, which argued for close scrutiny of the course and size of the Soviet purchases? And why, in

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September 1972, when the magnitude of the Soviet grain purchases was finally clear and its impact felt worldwide, did Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz order still another five million acres of wheat land idled? With the presidential election less than two months away, Butz ignored the recommendations of the Cost of Living Council staff and its director George Shultz to put more land into production. As one Agriculture official put it afterward, "Butz didn't want to be known as a cheap food man in an election year." Shultz finally prevailed in 1973. But by then it was too late for farmers to plant more wheat. Payments to farmers during 1972 and 1973—as overseas food aid was being severely cut—amounted to some $6 billion, more than the total international economic assistance given by the U. S. during roughly the same period.

Yes, We have No Soybeans

The Russian wheat deal together with the massive election-year idling of acreage were only the most conspicuous examples of "unnatural" forces at work on food in 1972. Decisions in the Department of Agriculture were also producing similar results in soybeans.

The U. S. is the world's main supplier of soybeans, currently producing 75 per cent of the total crop and accounting for over 95 per cent of the international trade in the commodity. Like wheat, soybeans are in heavy demand abroad both as livestock feed and for direct consumption by hundreds of millions of Asians. As a high-protein vegetable, soybeans have become an important substitute for dwindling supplies of fish protein. Yet, agricultural scientists and officials have known since the early 1960s that soybean yields do not respond to applications of fertilizer and can be increased only by planting more acreage. But, again, events in 1972 showed little planning or concern in Washington for the scarcity of a vital food resource.

When the Peruvian anchovy catch failed early in the year, the demand for soybeans soared. But prospective international buyers soon discovered that in the 28-million-ton Soviet grain purchase were nearly seven million tons of non-wheat grains, notably soybeans. Moreover, a late U. S. soybean harvest could not be moved because boxcars were tied up moving the Russian grain. Demand rose in February, after the devaluation of the dollar, and by May the price of soybeans had risen over 350 per cent and soy meal 300 per cent. In June the Chicago Board of Trade suspended nearly all trading in soybeans. Finally, on June 27 the Department of Commerce slapped on a soybean export embargo.

For U. S. exporters, the profits of this venture were immense. Soybean exports were $2.7 billion by the close of 1973, more than three times the volume in 1969. But this increase meant high meat and poultry prices for American consumers as well as crippling inflation and new deprivation for the poor countries. The final touch was that soybeans had been one of the commodities American farmers had been paid *not* to grow in election year 1972.

Selling Agribiz

The wheat and soybean fiascos expose two things: the planning failure of American food policy, and the government's lack of understanding of the momentous market forces it was unleashing when it promoted agricultural sales abroad. Of all these events, the 1972 run on soybeans illustrates most vividly the government's inability to conduct any sort of food policy besides a simple sales promotion for agribusiness. Although the soybean scarcity which developed in mid-1973 had been predicted by Agriculture's Economic Research Service as early as September 1972, nothing was done until the situation was completely unmanageable. Butz

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and his advisers adamantly opposed controls, ostensibly on the basis that curtailing exports would drive foreign buyers to alternate suppliers. This was a strange rationale, given the fact that the U. S. is the source of virtually all of the soybeans traded on the international market.

When Agriculture finally acted, it did so with a heavy hand. The embargo on soybean exports was imposed on June 27, 1973, and two days later the Commerce Department's Office of Export Administration began, with Agriculture, a series of public conferences with representatives of the grain trade. Those sessions revealed that the U. S. officials lacked hard information on the most basic aspects of the problem, including data on crop-growing areas, transportation patterns, and reliable supply and demand estimates. Perhaps the most significant fact about the lengthy hearings is that no outside views were invited. The only people involved were precisely those who were responsible for the mistakes.

In a subsequent investigation of how Agriculture handled the 1972-1973 soybean exports, the General Accounting Office concluded that most of the difficulties could have been avoided if the Department had acted more decisively at an earlier date. There had been a "policy failure," said the GAO, because of the government's inadequate control over the futures market and its grossly inaccurate reporting system on exports. The GAO also faulted Agriculture for its lack of a comprehensive reserve system coupled with "unresponsive and inflexible" export policies. As one GAO official put it, "Most of these decisions are backed into rather than structured and analyzed." The GAO findings would make fascinating background reading for the delegations to the Rome Food Conference as they prepare to hear the U. S. representatives, including both Kissinger and Butz, explain the present crisis and the American response to it.

The Food Barons

The GAO reports pointed only to one dimension of the scandal in U.S. food policy. Beyond Washington's official neglect of situations, beyond the uninformed decision-making, beyond the absence of a policy to deal with devastating scarcities, there is the shadow of the vast, unpoliced food market in the U. S., where a pliant Agriculture Department seldom dares venture. It is that market—more than Kissinger's or Butz' speeches—that still largely determines American food policy toward a hungry world and an angry American public.

A recent study of the world food problem by the Federation of American Scientists described U. S. food policy and its management by the Department of Agriculture as "disingenuous." In the sense that the government simply has no authentic policy on food, the charge is appropriate. But where Agriculture and U. S. agribusiness corporations have met over the last two years in managing rising prices and profits, there is the impression that both sides understand one another—and the effects of their actions—very well indeed. If there is an apt comparison for U.S. spokesmen to draw between oil and food, it is that the food industry today resembles nothing so much as the petroleum "robber barons" of nearly a century ago. The six largest American grain companies, which together account for more than 90 per cent of all the grain shipped in the world, are largely beyond the scrutiny of those government agencies charged with controlling corporate activity. On the domestic market, four companies sell 90 per cent of all breakfast foods, three sell 85 per cent of all the bananas, one sells 60 per cent of all baby food consumed, and one 90 per cent of all the soup. In more critical commodities such as wheat, corn, soybeans, and other basic grains, a small number of major companies—Cargill, Continental, Ralston-Purina, Bunge,

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Peavey—exert practically total control.

At the center of the complex array of domestic food markets and the beginning of all the United States' international food sales and aid programs are the commodity exchanges in Chicago, Kansas City, New York, Minneapolis, and a score of other key shipping and port cities. It is in the nation's commodity exchanges—where future crops of grain are sold, where livestock still on the farm is bought and sold, and where fortunes may be won or lost in an instant—that the "free market" resides. But dominated and manipulated by concentrations of economic power, it is neither free nor publicly accountable.

The financial stakes in this food market are as enormous as the human consequences at home and abroad. In 1971 and 1972 the various commodity exchanges did business valued at $189 billion, an increase of more than 300 per cent over the level of ten years before. In fiscal 1973, trading activity totaled almost $400 billion or more than 200 per cent higher than the previous year. If that growth rate continues, and there is every indication that it will, 1974 trading will be valued at nearly $800 billion. The futures market determines not only the price of food, but in a major way how much food will be available in any given year. Agriculture officials admit that many, if not most, farmers decide what and how much they will plant by watching the price of futures. It is as if AT&T decided how much telephone service would be provided or electric companies how much power to supply on the basis of day-to-day fluctuations on the New York Stock Exchange.

The Nod Squad

The agent of public control over this extraordinary system, the agricultural equivalent to the Securities and Exchange Commission is the Commodities Exchange Commission, composed of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General. The Commission has no staff of its own and, according to officials, "rarely meets more than once a year." In a 1973 Supreme Court decision it was reprimanded for its "failure to regulate." Moreover, the Commission's operating agency, the Commodity Exchange Authority, which is charged with monitoring the market, has in large part turned this authority over to the professional traders themselves.

A 1965 congressional investigation of the Commodities Exchange Authority, in the wake of a major futures scandal, concluded that CEA's regulatory activity was "inadequate to disclose or even discourage abusive trade practices." In 1971 an internal audit by the Agriculture Department reported essentially the same failures. In an interim report on the Exchange Authority submitted to Congress in early May 1974, the GAO concluded that "these deficiencies continue."

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The GAO investigators also found that while the volume and value of trading had soared to record highs, the level of CEA regulation had actually declined.

In 1972 the CEA *cut* its staff as the volume of trade on the market was increasing more than 70 per cent and the value doubling over 1971 levels. The staff cut was presumably to offset the cost of a $35,000 computer monitoring system designed to spot trade violations. But here the laws of bureaucracy took over. The computer system was so efficient that it spotted more violations than the decreased staff could adequately investigate. But rather than seek additional staff or even investigate the most flagrant cases with the existing staff, the CEA administrator simply abandoned the computer system as "unneeded and unworkable." In 1974, the GAO reported of the CEA, in characteristic understatement, that "the lack of adequate staff has been a basic management problem."

Commodity Exchange Authority officials act on the policy that the exchanges are self-regulating. But more than five years after the Commodity Exchange Act was amended to require self-regulation, none of the exchanges had enforcement programs which conformed to the provisions of the law. It was only in December 1973 that the Exchange Authority itself adopted a regulation which required each exchange to enforce its own trading rules, and then, only one of the Authority's regional offices specified a time limit for compliance with the rule.

Powder Puff Control

Examples of the abuses in food markets are almost too numerous to cite, ranging from price-rigging in egg, wheat, and meat futures, to manipulation of buying margins by traders to shift profits and losses between the accounts of customers and the trader. A recent price manipulation scheme reportedly went undetected for months because blocs of traders worked together to keep purchases below reporting limits. Even CEA officials acknowledge that major trade practice investigations by the CEA are the only means to insure against such practices, but it is precisely these types of investigations that the Authority is unable to conduct because of its inadequate staff. Instead, it conducts what the GAO called "very narrow scope" investigations of single transactions or of those trades where a complaint had been received. Of the 16 such narrow investigations begun during 1973, however, only six had been completed by the end of the year. In its nearly 40 years of operation, the Exchange Authority has issued less than 230 formal complaints against violators of the Commodity Exchange law. An independent investigation by the GAO of one exchange during a single three-month period, however, discovered 50 cases where traders had probably violated the Act.

All of this affects, of course, the price, supply, quality, and shipment of critically needed U. S. food in the world market. Incredible as it seems, in a very real sense the United States goes to the Rome Food Conference as a captive of the staffing patterns and the regulatory practices of the Commodity Exchange Authority.

All Foods Lead to Rome

The problems facing the Rome conference are staggering. Food prices are at historic highs. In the poor countries, where people spend 70 to 80 per cent of their income for food, prices have gone up as much as 30 per cent. A 1974 UNCTAD study warns that the consequences of world inflation are gravest for the "largest and poorest" developing countries, threatening "a serious deterioration in levels of food consumption." For the developed countries, said the study, the prospective trade deficit in oil, large though it is, represents only a very small percentage of their total

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GNP, and no more than two per cent for the U. S., even taking into account the increased costs in food, fertilizer, and manufactured goods from increases in petroleum prices. The upshot is that the oil producers and the U. S., along with other food suppliers, have been exporting inflation in food and fertilizer prices to the people who can least afford it. Meanwhile, the United States, which has been providing about 75 per cent of world food aid, has had to cut back assistance from $1.1 billion in 1972 to $863 million in 1973. The recent "increase" in "amounts" for food aid, announced with apparent fanfare by President Ford at the UN, was rhetorical fast figuring which only matches the dollar cost of the aid in 1972, with 20 per cent less in quantity.

Looking the Other Way

Some experts believe that a billion people could face starvation before the crisis can be eased. For such a castastrophe, the oil prices and neglect of agriculture in countries like India will bear some responsibility. But the food decisions of 1972 and the general perversities of its food policy give the United States an ample share in the common disaster.

The prospects are bleak for constructive reform of the crucial U. S. role in world food. With few exceptions—Senators Humphrey and McGovern, reporter Clark Mollenhoff—neither the press nor Congress seems interested in the dreary, confusing details that lie at the heart of agricultural policy. The events and figures recounted in this article are in the public domain, but they rarely, if ever, appear in the increasingly fashionable dialogue on the food crisis. The liberal critics of the Nixon Administration, and most notably the economists, have long tended to treat agriculture as a subject beneath their sophistication, the province of sunburned bureaucrats and dull commodity markets.

Least of all is there any awareness of the problem or any impulse for change within government. The officials in agriculture see their constituency, as they have for 20 years, as the agribusiness complex. Secretary Butz is a direct representative of that complex. His policies, foreign and domestic, mirror the impersonal corporate interest in profit. Kissinger, who sizes up his Cabinet rivals with meticulous care, cannot be unaware of what Butz stands for. Yet the Secretary of State appears supremely uninterested. The prospect is that the U. S. delegation in Rome, even with Kissinger's fleeting presence for appearances, will float, perhaps in new dress, essentially the same old formulas for restoring food reserves and concentrating on agricultural technology in development programs. So long as the U. S. food market remains so far beyond public planning and monitoring, however, such pledges at Rome will be scarcely more than diplomatic rhetoric.

Seldom has an aspect of our foreign policy been so entwined with domestic politics and so central to the welfare of *both* the American consumer and millions abroad. And seldom has a connection in policy and politics been so misunderstood or disregarded. All of us suffer the abuses of the present system. Hungry children in Bangladesh could benefit from the restoration of truly free competition in American agriculture no less than inflation-plagued housewives in Ohio or New York.

By 1980, the UN has projected, food needs in the world will increase by almost 50 per cent, and world protein supplies will fall short by one third. In the incalculable effects of those trends on human lives, let alone the possible political results of the imaginable calamity, the making of a new food policy seems a task worthy of the best efforts, not just of a President and a Secretary of State but of all the rest of us who can no longer leave it up to the Butzes of the world. ■

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Tidbits and Outrages

They Done Wright Wrong

In April 1973 we published an article by Marjorie Boyd, "Why Congress Didn't Investigate Watergate *Before* the Election." Richard Dudman of *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch* now adds to that story:

. . . before the scandal began to unfold, Mr. Ford, as House Republican leader, played a part in suppressing the facts until after President Nixon had won his landslide reelection victory. . . . That earlier incident involved a [1972] investigation by Wright Patman, chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee. . . . President Nixon's concern about the Patman inquiry became known in the course of the House impeachment inquiry when Nixon reluctantly made public edited transcripts of certain White House tapes last April 29.

The Sept. 15, 1972, tape showed that Dean was briefing Nixon on the various problems he faced. . . . Dean brought up the Patman investigation. He said he wasn't sure he could "turn that off."

Dean suggested that Stans be directed to go to Ford and explain to him the problems that the Patman inquiry would create. "We just don't want Stans up there in front of the cameras with Patman, and Patman asking all these questions," Dean said. "It's going to be the whole thing, the press going over and over and over again."

Nixon picked up the idea and said, "Jerry has really got to lead on this." He settled on White House aide John D. Ehrlichman as the person who should talk to Mr. Ford and said Ehrlichman should tell Mr. Ford, "Now, God damn it, get the hell over with this."

Nixon said Mr. Ford could talk to the ranking Republican on the committee, William B. Widnall of New Jersey—"just brace him" and tell him Nixon thought it was time for him to "start behaving." Nixon said he could not talk to Mr. Ford himself but "He's got to know that it comes from the top. . . he's got to get at this and screw this thing up while he can, right?"

Mr. Ford was asked about the episode last November at a Senate hearing on his confirmation as Vice President. Senate Democratic whip Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia asked him to relate "your role, if any, in the blocking of an investigation by the House Banking and Currency Committee into the Watergate break-in."

Ford acknowledged that he called two meetings of the Republican members of the committee at which the Patman inquiry was discussed. The real issue, he said was that Patman "was going about the matter in the wrong way." Ford said he called the meetings after several members had asked him to do so. . . .

Senator Byrd asked: "But as I understand you, any efforts that you may have contributed toward the stifling or impeding or blocking of such investigation would be harmful to the President, harmful to his chances of reelection, or harmful to your party." Mr. Ford replied: "The answer is no, Senator Byrd."

Byrd asked Mr. Ford whether he had been in contact with anyone at the White House indicating that the White House wanted him to lend his efforts as a congressional leader to blocking the investigation. Mr. Ford denied "categorically" that he had had any such conversations with Haldeman, Ehrlichman or Dean and said he did not recall that the matter had come up in his frequent conversations with William E. Timmons, the President's liaison officer with Congress.

The upshot of Mr. Ford's testimony was that he acknowledged, in effect, that he helped block the inquiry but that he interpreted his action as a proper move in the interest of correct procedures and not as any part of the White House coverup.

Patman's list of proposed witnesses that he wanted to subpeona contained names that later became familiar in the televised Senate Watergate hearings, when the scandal was exposed in full: Sally Harmony, Frederick LaRue, Jeb Stuart Magruder, Robert C. Mardian, John N. Mitchell, Robert Odle, Herbert L. Porter, Hugh W. Sloan, Stans and many others.

Dean testified that "if those hearings had been held, there is a good chance these hearings would not be held today, because I think that would have unraveled the coverup."

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Quotas on Life

David Burnham of *The New York Times* continues his excellent series of articles on our government's safety agencies with this report:

The government official in charge of a federal program to protect the lives and safety of workers in southeastern Ohio has been accused of setting a quota limiting the number of violations his inspectors could impose on delinquent companies.

The accusation against Peter M. Schmitt, director of Columbus area for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, became known as the agency's Washington headquarters prepared a reply to a Senate staff committee report charging that the agency nationally "has been shackled by administrative ineptness."

The allegation that Mr. Schmitt set a negative quota for some inspectors at a meeting on April 8 was made by Joe Velaquez, a special assistant in the Ohio State Department of Industrial Relations. It was supported by a note written about the quota by Mike Ypsilantis, one of the four inspectors who attended the session.

According to the note, Mr. Schmitt said that if an employer had ten workers the inspector could cite five violations each visit, if there were 20 workers there could be ten violations, 30 workers up to 15 violations, 100 workers from 15 to 20 violations, 1,000 workers from 25 to 40 violations, and 10,000 workers between 40 and 60 violations.

Taking Stock

The GAO has disclosed that 19 Federal Power Commission officials own stock in companies affected by FPC regulations. Seven of the officials were administrative law judges who write major regulatory decisions for the FPC.

The Ad Game

Opinion magazines have a difficult time attracting advertising. We, for example, were somewhat depressed recently when Little, Brown canceled a full-page ad for *Kissinger* by Marvin and Bernard Kalb after we ran an unfavorable review of the book. But every cloud has its silver lining. If we lost Little, Brown, *The National Review*'s steadfast rationality has attracted South African Airways.

Money Talks

There is a move underway in the Senate to limit members to $15,000 per year in speaking fees. Why the measure is needed is explained by Jerry Landauer of *The Wall Street Journal*:

Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield has been acting lately like a nervous football coach before a big game. Over and over these days, he is ordering roll-call votes on trivial matters, just to keep his charges from roaming.

"The leadership has been forced to use these bed-check votes, so called, to get the members here in sufficient numbers to comprise a quorum," Sen. Mansfield recently explained, after 35 of the 100 Senators from both sides of the aisle had failed to show up for voting on amendments to a controversial bill. . . .

Such a dismal turnout isn't just an election season phenomenon. The number of missing members sometimes exceeds one-third, even when Senators aren't running for reelection or for the White House. . . .

During a round of voting on emergency energy legislation last year the number of absent Senators reached 44. The same number failed to vote on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972. On occasion the Senate enacts legislation with more members absent than voting "aye." Once it sent President Nixon a disputed appropriations bill by a vote of 27 to 25; 48 Senators didn't vote.

All this absenteeism has many causes. But one of the biggest, and perhaps least recognized, is the senatorial thirst for speaking fees. Almost any day of the week, whether the Senate is in session or not, somewhere in the country one or more Senators probably is speaking for a profit—to businessmen, labor leaders, students, trade associations, church-goers, or anybody else who will pay the price. Depending on the Senator's popularity or the importance of his committee assignment, that fee ranges generally from $500 to $2,500.

In 1973, the Senate's collective income from "honorariums" topped $1 million for the first time. That was nearly three times more than the 1969 total, and it was 75 per cent higher than the preceding year. Thirty-seven Senators earned more than $10,000 apiece in speaking fees, 18 pulled in more than $20,000 apiece and three (led by Democrat Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota with $65,650) grossed more in honorariums than from their $42,500 government salaries. Only four Senators gave all their speaking income to charity.

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WHY JOHNNY CAN'T WORK:

The Snobbery Factor

by Suzannah Lessard

Equality of Educational Opportunity, otherwise known as "The Coleman Report," certified its author, James S. Coleman, as "a good man" in the world of education. I was first introduced to the recently issued Second Coleman Report (officially *Youth: Transition to Adulthood**) by Jerome Karabel, a sociologist and teaching fellow at Harvard, in *The New York Times Book Review*. Judging from Karabel's review, Coleman has gravely endangered his certification. The thrust of this new document, the reviewer reports, is that the long-term incarceration of young people in educational institutions has created a youth culture which hinders adjustment to adult society and nurtures an irresponsible, immature mentality. According to Karabel, the Coleman panel's prescription for this problem is to get students out into the working world where they would experience the discipline imposed by production goals, learn self-management, and develop a sense of responsibility in contrast to the present situation in which (here he quotes from Coleman), "excluded from the central institutions of our society," students develop an image of themselves as "outsiders" with no "stake in the existing system."

"How much," wrote Karabel, "would youth learn about self-management in the often bureaucratic contexts of American work places? It seems clear that what the Coleman panel really means by self-management is management of one's self for the purpose of *adjusting* to existing institutions." He goes on, "Despite well-intentioned talk of extending school-work alternation schemes to college preparatory students, the real consequence of more career education would be the development of a dual tracking system which would accentuate inequality in the schools. . . [producing] technically proficient but culturally impoverished automatons,

***Suzannah Lessard** is an editor of* **The Washington Monthly.**

**Youth: Transition to Adulthood*. Report of the President's Science Advisory Committee, James S. Coleman, chairman, et al. Chicago University Press, $8.50, $1.95.

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adept at their specialized tasks and suitably docile in the realm of politics. When combined with a proposal for a dual minimum wage, with young people in the 14 to 18 age range to be paid less than the prevailing standard, expanded career education on the job would provide a massive new pool of cheap labor vulnerable to exploitation. Were it to have tried, the Coleman panel could hardly have come up with a plan better tailored to the needs of the corporate economy." Having described the report as a "bold strategy to strike at the very roots of the youth culture," Karabel concluded, "One can only hope that despite it all they ["youth"] will be able to protect the integrity of their educational institutions and maintain and pursue their critical, albeit unsettling, perspectives on adult society."

After this build-up, the report itself seemed almost comically bland and sensible. The specific target of the report was not political discontent at all but the segregation by age of "youth" from each other within the school system, and from adults outside it. Eighth graders, off in their own "junior high," don't come into contact with either first graders, or even seniors in high school, and their relationship to the few adults with whom they do have contact is essentially passive. They are, as the panel puts it, the receivers of nurture rather than the providers. This is contrasted to the structure of a summer camp, in which junior counselors, often as young as 14 years old, both enjoy the benefits of the camp and supervise the activities of the younger children, thus sharing the responsibility with the adults to whom they are themselves accountable, and *doing* something for children younger than themselves. The implicit conclusion is that this kind of experience prepares a young person for "real life" much better than the situation in which, totally subordinate to adults, yet free of any responsibility, a young person lives in an asylum-like atmosphere where he or she interacts only with equally unfettered-but-subordinate peers. Besides advocating a return to a school

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system which throws all ages together, the report recommends that young people also be exposed to the adult world, and adult tasks, by going out and working in real jobs, where adults will expect them to produce at the same time they learn from the adults' greater experience. Very sensibly, the report points out that the drastic division between going to school and going to work has the bad effect of forcing teenagers who are impatient with school to irrevocably leave it behind (thus slotting them in a fixed position in life). It also unnaturally shelters those who choose higher education from the chance to *do* as well as learn, and postpones exposure to "the real world," often until they are late into their twenties.

The splicing of job programs into high school and college is not the only suggestion the report makes to remedy this situation. It also cites the heavy demand for "continuing education" (in which learning is spliced into a working life instead of vice versa) and another possibility, "recurrent education," in which a person would alternate between school and work. The report notes that a limited pattern of recurrent education has already begun to evolve in this country as many college students leave after one or two years to work and then return to school, often with the formal agreement of the school. This still confines education to a fairly young age-group, however. Ideally people should be able to return to school at intervals throughout their lives to deepen their knowledge in their given field, or to broaden their knowledge beyond it, or simply to refuel, to draw back from the unrelenting, draining career rat-race.

'I Won't Grow Up'

The targets—institutionalized age segregation and the separation between work and learning—are very clearly drawn in the report, but the reasons for the attack—the disadvantages of the status quo, the advantages which would be gained by reform—are extremely vague. This vagueness is the soft spot which drew Karabel's fire. All the report really tells us is that if they had jobs at an early age, "youth" would learn how to manage money or, more obscurely, "to manage themselves," and would learn to give instead of only taking. Otherwise the advantages of reform are vague, amounting, in the end, to a never-released outburst pent up in the meticulous, deadpan prose: "THEY WOULD GROW UP." Although he tries to write about it in the value-free social-scientist style, it is pretty clear that Coleman communicates what seems to be an arbitrary dislike of what he calls the youth culture, describing it as the successor to black leather jacket groups of the fifties (who differed from latter day "rebels" chiefly in that they did not enjoy the esteem of the majority of "youths") and, contradictorily, as both inward-looking (that is, interested only in each other) and abnormally concerned for the underdog at the expense of the establishment. We were told in the introduction to the report that the problem was a lack of exposure to the real world and real work, but in Coleman's essay on the youth culture, the fact that young people have produced their own newspapers, clothes manufacturers, and entertainment is cited as an example of "inward-lookingness." It would seem that "the youth culture," whatever that is, cannot win with Coleman.

There is an all-too-familiar sense of pique, of "grown-up" authority, over-reacting to the skepticism of the young, even of the mentality which would enjoy forcing a long-haired fellow into the barber chair and giving him a crew-cut. It was, perhaps, this musty attitude which first triggered Karabel's suspicions, and indeed, it does not strain logic to conclude that Coleman is seeking to reorganize the structure so that the "irresponsible" positions of objection to American foreign policy, and reevaluation of middle-class values by young people

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will be far less likely to develop. At least one can say that in treating the aspect of dissent from the establishment in the "youth culture" largely as an undesirable social phenomenon, Coleman gives only the most cursory attention to the values which generated much of it.

Up the Corporate Sandbox

Unfortunately, once one's suspicions are aroused that Coleman's real purpose is to stamp out political dissent by slipping young people into the system at an early age, the report only plays to those suspicions, finally outdoing itself with the recommendation not only that schools join hands with the business establishment in the education of the young, but that classrooms be moved right into the factory and office buildings, that day care centers and gathering places for the old also be incorporated into the working place, and that a joyous co-mingling of all ages working, learning, and playing under the corporate roof becomes the central institution of our lives. The picture of Mom and Dad, Junior, Baby, and Grandpa all happily leaving home every morning for General Motors is (fortunately) more hilarious than probable, a final vision which is likely to discredit the report which runs before it, the grains of wisdom along with the sour must.

Yet, though the report provokes suspicions, it remains that the targets alone are made clear and the reason for the attack is left vague—in fact, is full of contradictions. This, I think, is not because the panel is muffling a right-wing conspiracy but because the report is a political document in the sense that its authors are attempting to put over their ideas without antagonizing either the progressive education types or the conservatives. By implying that the proposal for job experience is a way to root out hippies, the panel could hope to gain the ear of the right. The problem with the left would be that "career education" is associated with blocking the poor from both spiritual fulfillment (through exposure to the humanities) and the ladder of upward mobility by corralling them into "dead-end" vocational slots. This is precisely how Karabel reacted, but the fact that he tagged the report as discriminatory doesn't mean that the panel didn't try to tailor its recommendations for approval from Harvard. The way in which the panel did this, and the way in which Karabel reacted, in spite of their efforts, reveals a very deep American attitude towards both work and education.

Very possibly in an effort to head off Karabel's reaction, the panel takes great pains to emphasize that the purpose of splicing a work life into a learning life is not because there is something innately valuable in the work itself, but because the experience would be a kind of lesson in life, a sobering exposure to reality to temper the heady rarefied atmosphere of the classroom. It is not for the purpose of learning a skill, we are told emphatically, but for the development of concentration on one thing over a long period; not for the value of producing something, but for the experience of the discipline imposed by the demands of production. The advantage for future members of the elite, they soothingly tell the liberals, will be to ease the transition from dependent youth in the educational greenhouse to adult responsibility. The advantage for the future blue-collar worker—here it gets a little

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vague—will be to make leaving school for work possible without forever closing off the options of following a higher calling, since the going to work at an early age would be institutionalized rather than called "dropping out of high school." An aside to the right: by participating in the real world, young people will begin to feel they have a stake in the system and dissenting tendencies will be thwarted. An example of contradiction brought about by dual courtship: how is a future rebel of the elite class going to be made to feel he has a stake in the system by working in the kinds of jobs which can be done by teenagers? And is a young autoworker of the "new breed" going to be any less likely to object to working conditions when he is employed as an adult fulltime, if he had a spell in the factory at age 14?

Looking Down on Real Work

Discipline, powers of concentration, exposure to the everyday world, all these are indeed valuable, but in the scrupulous elimination of the objective of producing something, from the stated purpose of the proposal, the panel reinforces a blindness which plagues much of our national self-analysis: the focus on process, the overlooking of goals. Coleman advocates doing for doing's sake, for the by-products of doing for the doer, not for the sake of what gets done, and in this he and Karabel, ostensibly on opposite sides of the debate, share a kinship. Despite the panel's careful insistence that the process is the purpose, Karabel jumps on them and says, No, you are really talking about training people for lifetime jobs, about "career education." Thus he is in effect joining forces with that thrust in the report which disavows any particular interest in learning a skill, invoking instead a vague notion of personal development, the darling concept of the liberals. Career education to Karabel means the cutting short of potential, the routing of less advantaged students into lower-class slots more quickly than they are at present. Technical proficiency, to him, is the virtue of "automatons," a mind-killer which engenders political docility. For Coleman, when he is appealing to the right, career education is a spirit-breaker. When he is appealing to Karabel, it has nothing to do with technical proficiency but only with the subjective effect upon the doer. Successful students in Coleman's program would report back to their mentors that they had learned to manage their own money, concentrate on a task for eight hours a day, day after day, and fulfill a responsibility, in the sense of achieving the approval of their employer. It would not be pertinent that they had made six solid tables, or had harvested a hundred bushels of potatoes, or had, by applying rudimentary medical and psychological knowledge, made the lives of ten physically distressed and lonely old people more enjoyable. Nor would it be pertinent if they had failed in these tasks, or, after a spell in the bureaucratic context Karabel so rightly attacks, had produced nothing at all.

In lashing out at the very idea of career education, even when it has been so carefully qualified as to eliminate any notion that actual accomplishment has anything to do with it, Karabel expresses a disdain for technical skill which is widely held in the liberal establishment. My hunch is that Coleman knows full well that the state of training for non-elite but essential skills in this country is abysmal. Much of it has been left to swindlers who perceive a ripe opportunity in the hundreds of thousands of people who desperately want to acquire a marketable skill and are willing to put down their last penny for training which will either send them into a job unequipped to handle it, or, more likely, as unhireable as they were before. (See Peter Cowen's article on trade schools, page 29.) I think Coleman also knows that the

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liberal education establishment can probably effectively sabotage any program they dislike, that career education is, in that world, a dirty word, and that respect for the "lower" skills generally is practically nonexistent, connoting a thwarting of potential. So he tried to serve what he knew to be the very worthy cause of career education by putting it across as something else, by describing it chiefly as a way to give future professors of philosophy a glimpse of reality before they reach the ripe old age of 25.

The Beacon in the Fog

This is, of course, only a theory: perhaps the skewed, evasive aspects of the report are simply the result of compromises between the members of the panel, or perhaps the contradictions and evasions are simply the expression of ambivalences unanimously felt by the panel. The theory that the authors were trying to court different factions at the same time nevertheless fits the report, which is like a landscape with two strong beacons on it—age segregation is wrong, and exposure of young people to real work is needed—and then a host of obscure signals, apparently sent out for different sets of eyes (catchwords like "adjustment to the system" for the right, "personal development" for the left) and together amounting to a diffused set of semi-recommendations and expressions of philosophy. And then there is a huge, gaping hole in the picture, for while the report is addressing itself to on-the-job training as an extension of educational opportunities, it not only ignores the desperate need for such training—in the practical sense of acquiring a skill so you can get a job and do it well—but swears up and down that this is not the goal.

Thus having trashed the one most compelling reason for instituting such a program, the panel sets forth a series of worthy, but vague and subsidiary, reasons for why we should institute this massive, quite radical reform. It is as though they had built a bridge and left out the piers and pylons. They have hung in the air the gossamer cables and twinkling lights of words such as "transition," "maturity," and "self-management," spun together with the warm sense of a humanitarian (and at the same time disciplinarian) process which will elicit the best in human beings, and left them there, ghostly apparitions with no support. Given this peculiar construction, one can hardly blame Karabel for saying the piers and pylons are merely hidden in the fog, and that the real goal of the program is job-oriented career education.

My theory also fits the situation in the intellectual (and political) world which the panel knew they would have to contend with, and that situation is the die-hard factionalism which causes people often to reject ideas out of hand because the shibboleths are not right. I am not talking about Jerome Karabel here, for I know nothing of his history, and he may well be one of the few truly independent thinkers in the country. I'm speaking rather of a general pattern of behavior which the authors of the Coleman Report knew might either kill or launch the ideas in their report. However sincerely questioning, writers and intellectuals have an investment in the labels attached to them, just as surely as liberal congressmen have an investment in their image and risk a serious erosion of support if they vote against bills which, however dubious, have been tagged liberal. In journalism, if James J. Kilpatrick, who has risen to fame as a "respectable" conservative, began advocating things like higher welfare payments, he would risk his television spot. Gloria Steinem would risk her position as a spokeswoman if she began qualifying those principles with which she has come to be identified. (What ever happened to Betty Friedan?)

The same kind of connection between success and identifying labels exists in the more specialized and

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intellectual fields as well. One of the chief differences, however, between politicians and intellectuals (or writers) on this score is that many politicians are perfectly capable of saying in private that they voted a certain way because they otherwise would have tarnished their image, thus at least keeping intact their own real beliefs. Intellectuals, on the other hand, can't bear the idea of such duality, and have to believe that they believe what they say they believe, even if the nagging feeling that they will blow their marketable identity is definitely influencing their pronouncements. Thus there is a temptation for someone eager to gain their support for an idea to mask it in passwords which conform to that identity and make the idea sound safe, rather than putting the idea forward in its strongest, clearest form. And thus those who seek to convince groups with opposing identities will try to concoct masterful blends of passwords, hoping each faction will only hear the Valentine messages meant for it.

Trying to Have It Both Ways

This is what I think the Coleman panel was up to—the trick of getting up to the altar with two brides without letting either know the other is there until the ceremony is over. Like the trick itself, the factional deafness, which makes this kind of guile necessary, is no doubt as old as human nature. And the art of manipulating the deafness has been well-established since the beginning of this country. John Marshall, afraid of impeachment, regularly threw decisions to one side and theory to the other, thus keeping his position of influence as Chief Justice. In our own time Patrick Moynihan has been the grand master (albeit not always successful) of conning both liberals and conservatives into supporting his ideas.

There are serious dangers in this kind of politicking with ideas, however. First, when we cease to say what we mean, we cease, often, to say anything at all. We cease to speak to each other. Secondly, when this kind of campaign is successful, the idea is likely to remain the prisoner of the strategy that launched it. Coleman had a great deal of credibility to draw on, and he stood a fair chance of overcoming factional deafness and reaching both sides with a forceful, candid report. But as it stands, by trying to gull both sides into thinking his recommendations are something other than they really are, he has created a proposal which is gutted of its most compelling value, and if executed in the form of a real program, would be as confusing and contradictory as the strategically constructed report.

The problem and the particular loss in the case of the Second Coleman Report points toward a much larger problem and a much greater loss. We build bridges of ideal "processes" in the air, while, in a literal sense, the real bridges—or at least the highways—are falling down. "Quality" is a nostalgia word. "Skill" conjures up medieval craftsmen. And as the collapsing economy goes on disgorging inferior, over-priced goods, we look at the process, and wonder what went wrong. Many things have gone wrong but one of them is that we have forgotten the value of doing things well at all levels. So what we produce has little value. Meanwhile, having a low regard for skill, we leave to hucksters the business of training people to do many of the essential jobs. Those short-changed students, meanwhile, are inevitably not trained at all, and kept outside the glorious process, they eke out marginal lives on welfare checks. We tell them we cannot make good training readily available to them because helping them acquire a skill would be to block them from the escalator of upward mobility and self-fulfillment. Since stockbrokers also have vast amounts of free time now, maybe the two groups will get to chatting. ■

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WHY JOHNNY CAN'T WORK:

The Robbery Factor

by Peter Cowen

The indifference of our public schools to training people for jobs has left the field largely to educational hustlers. One example is ITT Tech, the largest private vocational school in Massachusetts, with some 1,200 students. Housed in a two-story cinderblock building with a brick facade, it is just up the street from Boston University on a bleak commercial boulevard split by trolley tracks and lined with appliance and auto accessory stores, bars, used car dealers, and fried chicken concessions. Inside ITT Tech, hanging on the yellow cinderblock walls, are facsimiles of the Bill of Rights, U. S. Constitution, and Declaration of Independence, the latter partially obscured by a cigarette machine. To the right of the entrance lies a network of flimsy, five-foot-high partitioned cubicles. Inside them the school's salesmen—eschewing commercialism, they call themselves "representatives"—ply potential enrollees with their pitches.

Murmurs escape from the cubicles, subdued, low-key dialogues that lend an aura of dignity to the transactions underway within. Seated in folding chairs outside the cubicles, are half a dozen young men dressed in working clothes, waiting to be interviewed.

Peter Cowen is a reporter for The Boston Globe. *This article was based on research by a* Globe *investigative team that included Gerard O'Neill, Stephen Kurkjian, and Ellen Zack.*

Aspirants for future jobs in fields such as drafting, refrigeration repairing, or electronics, they are prospective students who probably thought it futile to apply at even the less exclusive state colleges. What they hear in the cubicles is known only to them and their salesmen, and if the youths claim months later, as many do, that they were deceived about ITT Tech, they will most likely be informed by school and state officials that the words on their contracts, not verbal statements, govern the school's responsibilities to them.

Curiosity about what ITT Tech salesmen tell prospects in private impelled a 29-year-old writer to pose as a potential student and invite a salesman to his unimposing three-room suburban apartment for a discussion of the school's $2,000 mechanical drafting course. An hour early, George Williams appeared at the door. He was a middle-aged man of medium build, with wavy, graying hair swept back from a receding hairline.

Williams began with an admonition about the necessity of a quick decision about applying: "I could come in with your enrollment tonight, and they could tell me, 'OK, George, now don't take any more.'" This theme was repeated throughout the interview. But the delivery was surprisingly casual. His air of detachment, combined with his warnings about how quickly classes were filling, was more effective than any brow-

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beating sales tactic in creating pressure to enroll. Williams explained that classes were so near—one week away—that the usual lengthy screening process would have to be abbreviated, "So it's up to me, being the senior man there, to say yes, this man in my opinion is qualified to take this program." Piqued at questions about the school, he asserted brusquely that ITT Tech had only a five- to ten-percent attrition rate, that 80 percent of its graduates had jobs in the fields they studied, and that a prospect's decision was of no consequence to Williams, since he was salaried and not commissioned. With classes nearing capacity, Williams said it would be self-defeating to visit the school before enrolling. "If you come over tomorrow," he snapped, "I can't guarantee you a place in the school. Your chances get slighter and slighter as each hour goes by."

Williams' spiel was persuasive and efficient, the product of his 15 years of experience selling for the school. It was also, as subsequent inquiry showed, completely false. There was little urgency about enrolling, for Williams told the same applicant a week later that he could still sign up the following week. The salesman himself, ITT Tech reported, was commissioned, not salaried. And statistics the school furnished to the Massachusetts Education Department disclosed that nearly 70 per cent of enrollees from 1971 to 1973 dropped out, many before classes began, and only half of those who actually graduated got jobs. In one course, figures for the last two years revealed a 93-percent dropout rate among its 142 enrollees.

What compels salesmen to exploit the dreams of youth, and what constraints, if any, does ITT Tech put on its sales force? Answering a newspaper advertisement for a salesman's job at ITT Tech offered insight into the origins of deception. "We're looking for people with a background in selling intangibles, such as insurance—or ideally, a successful track record in educational sales," the ad proclaimed. "If you are not now earning $18,000 per year, this could be the opportunity you've been looking for."

A writer posing as an applicant was greeted at the school by Donald H. MacCalmon, supervisor of "admission representatives." Affable, almost effusive, MacCalmon began with a picture of the job. "You know, I never really liked the canned pitch before I came here," he confided. "But here you have a canned speech you use with every lead. It's orderly, it's consistent, and what's best, it works. You're like an actor who plays the same role, although you can try different things out each time. But the role stays the same." As MacCalmon depicted it, the job held no risks for a salesman, as long as he continued bringing in contracts. Each week a salesman pursues 20 to 25 "leads"—potential students—and "scores" on four to six of them. The school pays salesmen $100 for each student, with a $10 bonus if the student attends his first class (the school's director said later that a quarter of enrollees never reach that milestone). A salesman receives his commission even if his student drops out before classes, and the school pays an extra $25 for enrolling someone without a school-provided lead. After the interview, the writer stopped for lunch at a neighborhood restaurant-bar, where he met an ITT Tech salesman. "What's it like working at ITT Tech?" the writer asked. "Selling is selling," the salesman answered, "whether it's redwood logs or this stuff [education]."

Spokesmen for both ITT Tech and the parent ITT Corporation refused to answer questions about their school for this article. Tom Elliott, an ITT official in New York, would not say whether the company felt any obligation to supply facts to the public, who, through veterans' benefits and federal grants and insured loans, pays so much of the tuition for ITT Tech students. But Elliott did have one request: "I would prefer that you not

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Penelope Breese

use my name, and refer to me as a spokesman." Elliott's position at ITT? Manager of public information.

Such corporate reticence is understandable, for the available information about ITT Tech does little to enhance its image as an educational institution. In 1972 the school spent $214,000 on teachers' salaries, compared with $296,000 on marketing, of which $186,000 was on salesmen's commissions alone. Between spring 1971 and spring 1973 some 2,300 students signed up with ITT Tech, so assuming half that number enrolled in calendar-year 1972, about $186 of each student's tuition was spent on teachers' salaries and $257 on marketing. Surprisingly, the school estimated a loss of $60,000 in 1972, about $52 per student. Yet the financial position of ITT's educational division is sound, with current assets of $8.3 million and liabilities of $2.7 million.

ITT Tech's priorities inevitably translate into student resentment. But while students have complained to Massachusetts authorities about misrepresentation, crowded classrooms, broken equipment, and inferior instruction, no action appears to have been taken against the school, which is licensed by the state. The most persistent grievance of the school's graduates is their inability to find jobs. "I have an ITT diploma, but it's worthless. The only job I could get was here," says a graduate of the medical assistance course, as she dusts off the display case of the shop where she now works as a clerk. A customer enters the store and the graduate walks over to wait on him. She is wearing the white nurse's shoes she purchased for the career ITT Tech's training was to provide her.

Many of the students' complaints stem from what the salesmen tell them. The spiel itself is a deceptively uncomplicated device aimed at shifting the burden of persuasion from the salesman to the prospective student. The technique probably preferred by most proprietary school

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salesmen is the "negative sell," named for its emphasis on the applicant's personal deficiencies. The pitch is subtle, crude, and in the hands of some salesmen, brutal. Its goal is to dispel the prospect's natural skepticism about salesmen by putting him on the defensive, questioning his sincerity and qualifications, and evoking a groundless fear of rejection by the school.

Paper Prestige

"Successful negative selling is a skilled art, not a matter of luck or accident," begins the salesman's manual used by LaSalle Extension University. The manual leaves little to chance. "If the prospect tries to put you off by saying something like 'I don't want to enroll now in the course,' tell him that's perfectly all right because 'I couldn't enroll you tonight.' " LaSalle also has advice for the hesitant, insecure salesman, apt to forget his own role: "Remember that you are the person in control of this interview. . . . *You* are assuming the sale can be made. *You* will determine whether or not *he* [the prospect] is qualified. . . ."

Even the slight, seemingly insignificant details of the interview must be planned in advance, for they may prove decisive. "*Use a ball-point or fountain pen as a pointer during the presentation*," the manual exhorts. "This gets the prospect used to the sight of the pen and prevents a defensive reaction later when the time comes to use it." Nevertheless, even the most fastidious salesman now and then encounters a recalcitrant who falters at the moment of decision. Salesmen faced with this symptom are instructed to proceed immediately to the Diploma Story. As the manual explains, "If you need to go to the diploma story, never underestimate the prestige and status this would mean to a prospect. Leave the diploma right in front of the prospect. Paint him a picture of it hanging on his wall. This could be his sole motivation."

Heavy Learning

Robert Heatley was laid off abruptly last May after devoting 10 of his 34 years to a job stocking the meat and frozen food cases at a supermarket near his home in Watertown, Conn. As he browsed through *TV Guide* one night, Heatley noticed an ad, slightly larger than a postage stamp, proclaiming opportunities to train as a heavy equipment operator at a school in Miami. Heatley, as he readily admits, is a dreamer, and he had long yearned for such a job, shepherding a powerful machine with a turn of a wrist, commanding, building, working under the sun. The ad, placed by Universal Training Services, Inc., gave few details, but to Heatley "it looked real good," and he contacted the school.

Heatley was soon visited by salesman Charles Sullivan, who began by pointing out that as a veteran, Heatley could apply for GI Bill benefits that would pay nearly the entire $1,300 cost of the course. Once he finished the 60-lesson correspondence portion of the course, Heatley would travel to Florida for five weeks of practical training that would prepare him for immediate employment at $10 to $12 an hour. Job opportunities in heavy equipment operation—driving tractors, graders, cranes, and other machines—were excellent, and although the 47-year-old salesman mentioned nothing about the need for union membership or a license, Heatley was left with the impression that the school would furnish the license.

Sullivan's description of the school excited Heatley and he enrolled that day, paying a $175 deposit. Anxious to begin his new career, the ex-supermarket clerk raced through the 60 lessons in five months, drawing encouragement from comments such as "Excellent" or "Very good" written neatly in red ink across his multiple-choice answer sheets.

Heatley drove to Florida and finished his training last July. He's been back in Connecticut since then,

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but has had no luck finding a job. Universal gave him the names of a few companies to try, but with the construction industry in a virtual depression, jobs are few and far between. An official of the state heavy equipment operators' union, Wayne Gyenizs, says there are several hundred men on the waiting list for union membership, largely because of the 15-percent unemployment rate in the industry.

Yet Robert Heatley remains convinced his investment will pan out, and he is quick to distinguish Universal from the Florida umpires' school he attended in February and March of 1970. After spotting its ad in a sports magazine, Heatley flew to Florida, paid the school $400, and studied there for five weeks until, having failed the examinations—"they were kind of hard"—he left without the umpire job and returned to stocking frozen food cases in Connecticut.

Have I Got A Job For You!

Charles Sullivan, Heatley's salesman, lives 13 miles west of Boston in an office-home from which he combs southern Massachusetts and northern Connecticut for Universal.

Sullivan sells all six of Universal's combination correspondence and resident training courses—motel management, truck driving, insurance adjusting, heavy equipment operations, airline personnel work and diesel mechanics—at costs ranging from $793 (motel) to $1,295 (heavy equipment). His sales pitch leaves the cheerful impression that success comes packaged with the loose-leaf courses, payable on an easy installment plan. "I think you and your wife would be fantastic in motel management," he told a writer posing as a prospective student. Sullivan, a high-school dropout, depicted himself as aloof from the sleazy tactics of rapacious, high-pressure salesmen. "Right away they try to get their foot in the door and give you a selling pitch," he stated knowingly. "We don't work that way, so upon the conclusion of my interview here, you're going to have to decide yes or no. It's a school rule." Universal's acceptance of an applicant is another matter, however, and to stress his own selectivity, Sullivan said he personally rejects more than half of all applicants, while the school rejects others after paying $25 per person to check their backgrounds "through a computer in Boston." Rigorous screening is possible because Universal salesmen, being salaried, lose nothing by rejecting a candidate. "This school doesn't work with commissions," Sullivan remarked. "We can go into a home and tell a fellow, 'Look, you're not really interested. Forget about it.' We don't lose a dime."

In fact the school doesn't require prospects to make their decisions at the first interview, nor does it use a computer to check their backgrounds. Salesmen reject few applicants, the overall attrition rate is about 60 per cent, and Sullivan, like all Universal salesmen, is paid on a commission basis.

Mail-Order Education

Reputed to be among the dozen largest proprietary schools in the country, Universal has an enrollment of 50,000, with the company's 150 salesmen roaming the nation to collect 800 new students each month. Salesmen, paid $135 and more per enrollee, have a monthly quota of five students, one source says. The school's success appears to stem from an ingenious arrangement whereby attendance at the resident institution is contingent upon completion of the mail-order course. For instance, with 60 per cent dropping out of the motel course without taking the resident training, the school could count a tidy profit if it only broke even with those who finished. Many students undoubtedly drop out once they consider the cost of a trip to Universal's training facilities in Miami or Las Vegas, plus room and board.

Universal was founded in 1945 by

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E. McSwiggan, Sr., a college dropout and former LaSalle salesman who, as its 71-year-old board chairman, now runs a company with annual revenues of $4 million to $5 million. To learn more about Universal, I arranged with G. W. McSwiggan, executive vice president of the family-owned company, to visit the school in Miami and observe its training program. But shortly before the visit, the 28-year-old vice president abruptly vetoed it in a letter that said he had just been "informed by our board of directors" that an expansion program underway at Universal made the visit "inappropriate." McSwiggan didn't renew the invitation, nor did he admit—as he did in a subsequent telephone interview—that he had been aware of the program when he issued the invitation and that the board of directors included his mother, father, and brother.

The VA Cop-Out

Defensiveness is endemic at correspondence schools, especially the larger ones, because of recurring questions about the extent to which the schools' participation in federal funding programs such as the GI Bill is justified. Any change in the law removing mail-order institutions from eligibility for the use of veterans' benefits—a change that has been suggested by some advocates of reform—would devastate schools like Universal, where, according to Universal vice president C. L. Craig, two thirds of the students are veterans.

To determine the effectiveness of correspondence education for veterans, the General Accounting Office surveyed veterans taking mail-order programs in 1972. The results were startling. Three-fourths of all veterans were found to be dropping out of the courses. Students in several fields—including accounting, commercial art, drafting, and electronic technician training—quit at rates surpassing 90 per cent. The findings, however, haven't diminished the Veterans' Administration's enthusiasm for mail-order education, for last year the agency spent a record $120 million on correspondence courses for 427,000 GI Bill beneficiaries.

Indeed, in the last seven years, the Veterans' Administration has spent $1.4 billion on correspondence and other vocational education without having any notion, until the General Accounting Office report, whether the money was achieving its congressionally mandated objectives. VA officials have no idea whether veterans find jobs as a result of the training, nor does the VA know which schools have been subjects of repeated complaints by veterans about misrepresentation and poor quality education. Because it delegates the approval function to state agencies, the VA has little contact with the schools.

At one time the VA seemed concerned about whether the funds it dispensed were actually achieving any purpose. Complaints had been arriving from veterans at such a rate that the VA directed all approving agencies to require any vocational school seeking GI Bill approval to demonstrate "substantial" job placement of its graduates. The requirement brought immediate, vigorous opposition from Bernard Ehrlich, the chief proponent in Washington of proprietary education and attorney for two of the largest proprietary school accrediting agencies. The VA kept the requirement for two years, but in 1972 Ehrlich's opposition prevailed and the VA dropped the placement criterion. Morris Nooner, director of the VA's education rehabilitation division, says the requirement was "rescinded" in favor of a prescription for "overall quality" in course content.

The Veterans' Administration's indifference to vocational education reflects the indifference of government at all levels—federal, state, and local. No one cares except the people who need jobs—who want to acquire real skills that will give them real self-respect. They deserve better from us. ■

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'I Got My Job Through CREEP'

by Arthur Levine

From 1945 until 1969, it is probably safe to say, a majority of federal civil servants either got their jobs during the New Deal or got them through connections with people who had. The civil service during this period was an extended Roosevelt family. The connection could be remote indeed—you may have gotten your job from a friend of the son of a friend of someone who came into the Interior Department under Harold Ickes—but it still worked. Subsequent administrations—Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson—had little impact on the career service because they didn't know how to use its rules to get their own people hired, and by the time they learned the rules, they lacked the will. But the extended New Deal family knew the rules backward and forward and had developed the bending of them into high art—not, to be sure, as part of any conspiracy but merely to take care of individual friends of individual members of the family.

When the Nixon Administration came to power in 1969, it was granted an opportunity its predecessors were denied: thousands of jobs were opening up as the old Roosevelt hands were retiring. Not only were the jobs there, but the ways of filling them with one's friends were well known, even though they had never been systematically used. All that was needed was the will to put the two together.

Lyndon Johnson may have provided the goad Nixon needed when he admonished his successor to "clean house" and put Nixon loyalists in key jobs if he wanted to control the government—doubtless in the same tones he reserved for his confidential advice about the tax advantages of presidential papers. In retrospect it

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seems clear that Johnson was talking only about high-level appointees and venting his frustration at the Kennedy men he retained. Unfortunately, Nixon took the advice too literally and—after a brief flirtation with respectability in his first year in office—started applying it to the entire government in 1970.

A White House personnel office was set up to handle the placement of favored personnel into career and non-career jobs. The office dealt with political referral units in the various agencies. As part of the government-wide patronage scheme, a 100-page primer on how to dodge the federal personnel laws was written by Alan May, a former staff recruitment official for ACTION, the volunteer agency. The manual provides helpful hints on how to drive unwelcome employees from their jobs and hire political cronies.

Malek's Machismo

Nixon's instrument for obtaining bureaucratic control, the leading figure in the following narrative, was Alan May's mentor, White House aide Frederick Malek. Malek, who later became deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, was once described by Sally Quinn as the kind of person who never could wait behind other cars at an exit, he always had to drive up alongside the others and force his way in. Jeb Magruder in *An American Life* recalled how Malek once drove through a national park with brakes screeching and horn honking to scare away the bears other tourists had been waiting for an hour to see. Malek's gentleness of character was first noted on a federal level by Walter Hickel's staff at the Department of Interior, who were given 30 minutes to vacate their offices when their boss was fired in November 1970.

Malek, a former management consultant and self-made millionaire, brought a new efficiency to the traditionally folksy art of patronage. The friendly phone call to the right person was simply not good enough for the Nixon Administration. There had to be flow charts, memos, forms, manuals, computer banks, all the fine mounds of paper that proved something was getting done. Of course, this addiction to memos, as in the Watergate scandal, will provide future generations with the great moral lessons of the Nixon era—don't put it in writing and don't tape it. In the personnel field, Nixon aides were obsessed with memos, sending them back and forth in some private ritual, yet fearful all the while that their secret sheets of paper would be discovered. In a memo discussing the bureaucracy, Malek wrote, "First, there would be no written communications from the White House to the deparments—all information about the program would be transmitted verbally. . . . Second, the documents prepared would not indicate White House involvement in any way." While researching this article I waded through dozens of such memos directly linking the White House to political influence in the executive branch. At one point, an aide actually wrote on a "Confidential—Eyes Only" memo, "Burn Before Reading." Next to it Malekwrote, "Always."

Rough Stuff

The most enduring paper monument to Administration personnel policies and the Rosetta stone for many of the events that have since come to light is the delightful *Federal Political Personnel Manual*, "Dedicated to the United States Civil Service Commission." It provides a thorough review of Civil Service regulations and amusing instructions on how the conscientious Nixonite could avoid them. Publication of the manual this September in the weekly *Federal Times* created quite a stir in the capital. The tone of the book, with its macabre humor, is reminiscent of *Gulag Archipelago*—only told from the oppressor's point of view.

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The most interesting section of the manual is labeled "Techniques for Removal Through Organizational or Management Procedures." Among the highlights are:

(a-1) Frontal Assault

You simply call an individual in and tell him he is no longer wanted, that you'll assist him in finding another job and will keep him around until such time as he finds other employment. But you do expect him to immediately relinquish his duties.... Of course, you promise him that he will leave with the finest recommendations. You naturally point out that should he not accept such an offer, and he is later forced to retire through the regular process or his own volition, that his employment references from the Department and his permanent personnel record may not look the same as if he accepted your offer. There should be no witnesses in the room at the time. *Caution*: This technique should only be used for the timid at heart with a giant ego. It should never be used with that fervent, zealous employee committed to Democratic policies and programs, or to the bureaucracy....

(a-2) Transfer Technique

By carefully researching the background of the proposed employee-victim, one can always establish that geographical part of the country and/or organization unit to which the employee would rather resign than obey and accept transfer orders.... It is always suggested that a transfer be accompanied with a promotion, if possible. Since a promotion is per se beneficial to the employee, it immediately forecloses any claim that the transfer is an adverse action....

(a-3) Special Assignment Technique (The Traveling Salesman)

This technique is especially useful for the family man and those who do not enjoy traveling. What you do is to suddenly recognize the outstanding abilities of your employee-victim and immediately seize upon his competence and talent to assign him to a special research and evaluation project.... Along with his promotion and assignment, your expert is given extensive travel orders criss-crossing him across the country to towns (hopefully with the worst accommodations possible) with a population of 20,000 or under. Until his wife threatens him with divorce unless he quits, you have him out of town and out of the way. When he finally asks for relief, you tearfully reiterate the importance of the project and state that he must continue to obey travel orders or resign. Failure to obey travel orders is grounds for immediate separation.

Bad Apples

The Malek-May manual also recommends other techniques to crush unwanted employees. There is the layering technique—as in "layering" over insubordinates new employees who are loyal and faithful. By layering your own people into the organization, you insulate those likely to be roadblocks from important positions. In all likelihood these employees will resign in boredom or disgust. An administrator can also use the "isolation technique"—setting up a parallel organization to one already in existence and giving that new organization most of the real responsibilities previously vested in the old one.

Then, of course, there's the beloved "new activity technique," which isolates undesirable employees by creating an apparently meaningful, but in reality meaningless activity to which they are all assigned. This provides "a single barrel into which you can dump a large number of widely located bad apples." The manual cites Health, Education, and Welfare as an example, which could designate, say, Alabama, as a "model state" and then assign unwanted employees to visit various towns. "For office facilities," the manual suggests, "the Department of the Army might be prevailed upon to provide surplus buildings at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The Alabama State Department of Education, would, I am sure, be more than happy to provide school buses to bus HEW employees between their offices and the nearest town where they would live."

Jobs in Camelot

To justify these policies and to inspire greater zeal among those who would be carrying them out, the Malek manual cited the patronage sins of previous administrations. Some of

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these past abuses were created from whole cloth, such as the revelations that Larry O'Brien got rid of all disloyal bureaucrats in only 180 days, or that those shrewd Kennedy brothers hired a management consultant firm to survey the executive branch and determine important jobs at all levels. But the real importance of the manual was that to a limited extent it codified what had previously been purely an oral tradition, handed down from generation to generation within the Civil Service. Yet these abuses were not limited to the Nixon Administration. Most government employees, especially personnel officials, are at least somewhat familiar with the cronyism and pressure techniques listed in this how-to guidebook.

Larry O'Brien recalls that in his role as Kennedy's congressional liaison, political referrals made to him and the White House were passed on to appropriate federal agencies and departments. But he denies that any improper influence was used. "More often than not, the fellow didn't get the job," he recalls. Still, there was no public outrage when the Kennedy Administration did attempt to "open up" the civil service to "new blood"—that is, to hire all those bright whiz kids who wanted only to create Camelot and get their names in the newspapers. When the Peace Corps was formed, Sargent Shriver dispensed with old-fashioned civil service jobs and managed to get the people he wanted by calling them Foreign Service Reserve officers. They had no tenure and limited terms so that they would not be cautious or timid. One reason for this was that Shriver wanted to keep their vigor and idealism, just the qualities which job security would undermine. To the extent that the Kennedy Administration sought, in ways like these, to mold the executive branch in its own image, liberals felt it was a worthy goal because the right-thinking people were in charge. It seemed obvious to anyone who read the newspapers in those days that the civil service was often stagnant, inflexible, and an obstacle to progress. Trim the fat! Get rid of dead weight! There could hardly be a New Frontier if the bureaucracy remained sluggish and unresponsive. This outlook would only seem embarrassing when, years later, Nixon surveyed the bureaucracy and found it lacking. Who wants a government responsive to a thug?

LBJ's Friends

Lyndon Johnson, reared on the government payroll, knew better than the Kennedys how the bureaucracy worked, who to call, what to say. After five years of appointing his own people (and living with the Kennedy holdovers he neglected to remove), Johnson tried late in 1968 to insure the preservation of his coterie of friends through a number of organizational changes that converted political appointees into career civil servants, all with the approval of the Civil Service Commission. HEW was filled with Johnson loyalists when Nixon came into office. LBJ also managed to appoint his White House political recruiter, John Macy, to the chairmanship of the Civil Service Commission. Today, that would be regarded as a blatant conflict of interest. White

Answers to October puzzle:



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House aide Marvin Watson also took pains to clear political nominees for high-level career positions.

On the whole, the Johnson Administration was not a total stranger to techniques of bureaucratic harassment. Civil service columnist Mike Causey tells the story of a hated National Institutes of Health employee who was subjected to an unusual type of vendetta. After his supervisors unsuccessfully asked him to quit, they placed him in a virtual closet, with a tiny desk and chair, no phone or even a light bulb. He ended up coming to work wearing a miner's cap, so he could see in his office. Causey, whose *Washington Post* column is widely read in the capital, says, "That's an extreme example, but hounding an employee is the oldest trick in the world. You look for a man's Achilles heel; you figure out what he can't stand and then make him do it."

Taking Over

In the days before Nixon, however, the harassment was more sporadic and less political than it became after 1969. Under Nixon, it was elevated to a valuable tool of management. Nixon and his aides felt that the bureaucracy was essentially an alien, Democratic-inclined force that must be controlled if the Administration was to survive. He was not the first president to regard the bureaucracy as an obstacle to his otherwise perfect plans for government, but the others had all learned to make some sort of peace with it. Perhaps some of Nixon's hostility grew out of his own war-time experiences in the Office of Price Administration. Then he had been a lone Republican, surrounded by New Dealers, and some of that bitterness apparently remained over the years. His aides felt that you had to control more than the top executives and their aides; you had to reach down past the cabinet members and agency heads, past the assistant secretaries and key staffers, down to the career professionals themselves. As John Ehrlichman explained in a Watergate committee hearing, "It was just an itch on our part to get friends in the departments rather than the people that we found there. . . ." A staff member then asked, "Was this in career positions as well as other positions?" Ehrlichman answered, "Sure. Just like. . . the Democrats did that."

Nixon's men wanted to fill more than just the 1,200 Schedule C jobs, those defined by the Civil Service Commission as "key policy-determining jobs, or jobs having a close personal relationship to an agency head or his key officials." These jobs were pure political gravy, and went from grades 1 to 15 ($5,000 to $36,000 a year) and ranged from chauffeur to management positions. The list of Schedule C jobs is known as the "plum book" because it is a catalog of potential vacancies occurring when administrations change hands.

But after spending a little time with the Schedule C book, the Nixon men began to feel that there was a pitifully small number of non-career executive assignments, those key advisory posts such as deputy assistant secretary. All in all, there were 8,000 of these "super-grade" jobs, offering $36,000 a year—but these included "non-political" career appointments, too. There were only about 600 of the genuine political plums. Six hundred wasn't enough; it was not even adequate to go slightly further and appoint the few Executive Level I to V jobs, such as agency heads, general counsels, and so on. So the Nixon men chose to extend themselves, reaching down into the lower pay brackets, as well as toying with Foreign Service appointments and legal positions, both exempted from normal civil service requirements.

The best surprises of all, of course, were all those vacancies popping up each year, hundreds of thousands of them, slots opened up in part by retiring Roosevelt liberals, their social concern worn down over the years.

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They were the great trail-blazers of bureaucracy, people who could still recall names and functions of agencies that died long ago. Yes, the NRA, AAA, CCC, WPA, FSA. . . those were the agencies you could be proud of. But these new fellows, well, they were clean cut and all but kind of different.

Merit Probes

In giving Malek and his cohorts free reign, the Nixon Administration went far beyond previous administrations in the scope of its political clearance and patronage system. It was undoubtedly the most systematic assault on the merit system in the nation's history, another "first" for our history-conscious former president. Some of the major developments:

Civil Service Commissions investigations in late 1973 and 1974 unearthed illegal political referral units and job favoritism in the Small Business Administration, the General Services Administration, the Department of Housing and Urban Development and HEW's Social and Rehabilitation Service. The Commission also asked the Justice Department to investigate favoritism and evidence of harassment in one of its own agencies, the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA). Earlier Commission investigations of OEO and ACTION found cronyism and mismanagement. Rep. John Moss and the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service are currently conducting their own probes of merit system violations. The House committee has already unearthed examples of recruitment abuses in two government agencies.

And there's more: the Senate Watergate committee studied a so-called "Responsiveness Plan" intended to mobilize the bureaucracy for Nixon's reelection effort. The staff uncovered evidence that grants, regulatory authority and hiring policies had all been used to guarantee Nixon's reelection. The final report of the committee pointed out possible violations of the Hatch Act, which limits political participation of government employees. It also noted violations of conspiracy laws and of Executive Orders governing federal hiring.

In these various activities, the Nixon Administration's real departure was tampering with the civil servants, those long-time bureaucrats, protected by tenure after three years, who spend their governmental lives patiently waiting for upper-level vacancies. Turnover is considerable; roughly 200,000 new civil servants are hired each year, while an additional 500,000 positions are filled by promotions, transfers, or reassignments. The internal reshufflings can be accomplished without consulting the Civil Service Commission, but Commission approval is needed before you can hire new civil servants.

The Stamp of Approval

Administration officials grew adept at getting Nixon loyalists appointed to vacant posts, despite the rigors of the Commission's certification process. One way they did this was to hire people as consultants and then work to entrench them in career jobs. Another more complicated technique was to tailor job descriptions and requirements to fit the background of the desired appointee. They also kept vacancies secret from other employees. In addition, when faced with Civil Service Commission rejection of their applicant, they would occasionally just cancel the vacancy.

None of these abuses would have been possible if the Civil Service Commission had not given the blessing of certification to the Administration's pre-selected candidates. Critics raise the possibility of Civil Service Commission collusion or ignorance. A Department of Transportation engineer victimized by pre-selection says, "The Civil Service Commission hasn't done anything to prevent it. The Commission has been misled and they should have recognized irregularities."

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A congressional investigator told me, "All these appointments have the imprimatur of the Civil Service Commission. They had to have known what was going on."

The elaborate civil service procedures inadvertently lent themselves to the goals of the Nixon Administration. Lower-paying, entry-level jobs (those from GS-1 to GS-8) are least susceptible to political influence, because they are given out on the basis of competitive examinations. Of course, inside connections are useful in directing you towards existing vacancies. But mid-level and senior-level bureaucrats, earning between $12,800 and $34,500 a year, are selected through evaluations based on more subjective criteria. On the basis of the Form 171 application, the Civil Service Commission evaluates the applicant's education and experience, and assigns him an eligibility rating for those jobs for which he has applied. Candidates are then placed on the register for the areas and grades in which they have been rated as eligible.

Fooling the System

The next step, the certification process, which results in a recommendation of the three top candidates for each vacant post, is more selective. For entry-level jobs, the Commission just chooses the people with the three best test scores (with special consideration for veterans). For higher positions, the Commission usually makes its decision only after convening a three-member panel that includes two representatives from the agency with the vacant post. Civil Service Commission regulations require that all job vacancies be advertised and opened up to competitive examination. The agency seeking to fill a vacancy sends to the commission a job description and a list of the criteria candidates should meet. Usually, the agency will "name request" a specific individual they've recruited and want to have certified.

It is during the certification process that the fun begins. As the Malek manual explains, "Because of the subjectiveness of the certification process with respect to mid-level and senior level positions there is really no 'merit' in the 'merit system' save the minimum qualification that a candidate be eligible." Eligibility, too, can be falsified. In addition, the agency can pack the review panel or write a job description tailored to the resume of a pre-selected candidate. The manual tells its readers, "It's the bureaucratic patronage system—they can really insure the certification of someone they have pre-selected, *and so can you.*" (Emphasis in the original.)

As the manual explains it, here's how the process works:

"Let us assume you have a career opening for a staff recruitment officer. Sitting in front of you is your college roommate from Stanford University in California who was born and raised in San Francisco.

"He received his law degree from

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Boalt Hall at the University of California. While studying for the bar he worked at an advertising agency handling newspaper accounts. He also worked as a reporter on a college newspaper.

"Your personnel experts judge he could receive an eligibility rating for a GS-11.

"The first thing you do is tear up the old job description that goes with that job.

"You then have a new one written, to be classified at GS-11, describing the duties of that specific staff recruitment officer as directed toward recruitment of recent law graduates for entry-level positions, entry level public information officers for the creative arts, and college news liaison section for your public information shops, and to be responsible for general level recruiting for entry level candidates on the West Coast."

The manual goes on to describe how to make the specifications so specific that only a pre-selected applicant could qualify. It notes triumphantly, ". . . your candidate will certainly be among the only three who even meet the selective criteria. . . . In short you write the job description and selective criteria around your candidate's Form 171."

'Responsiveness' Plan

So the Administration, not long into its first term, began to put its loyalists into the bureaucracy, using the tactics of Malek's manual. Their next important project was to use these new government workers to help reelect the President. Toward this end they created, midway through 1971, the "Responsiveness Program."

By 1972, the program was in high gear, manipulating grants, jobs, law enforcement and public relations to win favor for the Republican Party and votes for the incumbent. An early example is a 1971 memo from Harry Dent of the White House staff to H. R. Haldeman and John Mitchell, which said, "I have also delayed the promotion of the Southeastern OEO man to the no. 3 spot in OEO until he demonstrates proof-positive that he is rechanneling money from Democrats to RN [Nixon] blacks." Malek wrote that, as part of the Responsiveness Program, "We should take action to ensure that the day-to-day departmental operations are conducted as much as possible to support the President's re-election." The Administration refined many of its "Responsiveness" techniques down to a science, for they had been implementing them even before the program was officially launched. At one point early in the first term, the White House even drew up this official form to be used when referring politically sensitive appointees to the various agencies:

IV. Value of Placement to the President Politically.

☐ Highest Political Value (Must Place)
☐ High Political Value (Place if possible)
☐ Moderate Political Value (Handle courteously)
☐ Little Political Value (Handle Routinely).

One typical referral from the White House to the General Services Administration read: "Enclosed is the resume of Mr. George M. Shirey, Jr. He is looking for a GS-13 or 14, PIO [Public Information Officer] type position. He will be qualified with the Civil Service so he can fill either a career or non-career slot. He is a must. Please consider his qualifications and get back to me with the possibilities as soon as possible." But Malek denied pressuring anyone, despite later findings of favoritism by both congressional and Civil Service Commission investigators. He was asked, by an Ervin committee staff member, "Was it your understanding that the referral units in the various agencies were to give special consideration to names sent over by the White House that were designated must?" He answered, "Yes. Yes, they were to give special consideration. Absolutely.

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But the special consideration was not in competition for a specific job, but to ensure that the person was exposed to a range of jobs for which he or she was qualified."

A former staff recruitment officer for ACTION, Stephen Royer, remembers things a bit differently. In a sworn affidavit submitted to the Watergate committee during the summer, the 29-year-old Republican activist revealed a startling variety of patronage practices. He worked under Alan May, who authored the Malek manual and joined ACTION shortly before the July 1, 1971, reorganization that merged VISTA, the Peace Corps, and other volunteer agencies into the conglomeration known as ACTION. At that time, ACTION had an annual budget of $140 million and 1,500 full-time employees. The bulk of the staff had Foreign Service Reserve appointments and were therefore exempt from Civil Service requirements.

A Secret Code

In his affidavit Royer says that ACTION applicants were graded on a personnel code form, which included boxes marked P, Q, and M. If an applicant happened to see the form and ask about the letters, he was told that they stood for Personality, Quality, and Maturity, with ratings from 1 to 5. Actually, these codes were for internal use and stood for Political and Minority. (The Q rating was really used to designate quality.) Minority applicants were graded on their value to the President, and the P rating was used to gauge the political importance the White House placed on his appointment. A P-3 rating, for example, meant that the applicant would neither hurt nor help the President's reelection, and that he lacked political backing. An M-5 rating meant that the unlucky job-seeker was considered unreliable and an opponent of the President. A Special Projects Unit researched the background of all applicants. Those with low ratings were sent computer letters informing them there were no vacancies, when, in fact, there were. Most of the applications that Royer was involved with were for civil service posts in VISTA.

Pressure Tactics

Royer says that during a visit to Seattle in August 1971, he witnessed candidates for two top regional office jobs cross-examined about their political beliefs. His affidavit charged that he was continually pressured to place politically favored applicants into jobs in regional offices.

In the fall of 1971, in addition to making weekly personnel progress reports to the White House, ACTION officials established a special "situation room," where they could view the progress of White-House-backed nominees undergoing selection. And in a special pep talk for staff recruiters, Alan May gave a blackboard lecture on how to remove unwanted civil service employees. Moreover, Royer says recruiting officers were required to "turn off" hundreds of qualified applicants who lacked the desired political connections. Because of these policies, Royer resigned in February 1972. Several months later, 14 civil service employees complained about political influence in the San Francisco regional office. In an informal interview with the Ervin committee, May said that he never intended to politicize the procedure for filling civil service jobs.

To flush out hold-over Democrats, in April 1973 ACTION sent transfer-to-Washington-or-else letters to 30 politically unreliable employees in regional offices. The action created a small sensation, and a Senate subcommittee led by Senator Alan Cranston investigated the problem. As a result of the publicity, the employees were able to keep their jobs, but they were pulled off their regular assignments and given meaningless jobs. One employee, Joseph Bass,

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recalls, "It felt like hell. We were given so many trumped-up assignments that you didn't feel like going to work in the morning. Some of us just sat around and read the newspapers. Your mind sort of atrophies." Eventually, he sought out friends in other divisions who gave him some more meaningful work to do.

According to Bass, favoritism continues under ACTION's new director, Dr. Michael Balzano, but it is now more personal than political. But in the summer and fall of 1973, a few hundred ACTION staff members were queried about their political philosophies during special regional seminars on the role of ACTION. Through the use of quizzes, speeches, films, and "rap" sessions, a high-priced University of Colorado consultant organized seminars designed in part "to effect attitudinal changes to make possible the attainment of the goals of ACTION." Participants were given quizzes that asked whether they agreed with statements like, "The goal of 'eliminating poverty' is unrealistic" or "Richard Nixon's election constituted a mandate for closing down OEO and other social welfare programs." Although the questionnaires were apparently anonymous, they were specially coded so ACTION officials could identify the respondents.

OEO Blitzkrieg

Social service agencies, like OEO and HEW's Social and Rehabilitation Service, were especially vulnerable to political attack. OEO received a lot of publicity during Howard Phillips' 1973 reign of terror. Phillips took office with a mandate to dismantle the agency, while bringing with him a crew of right-wing political appointees. The agency always had a large number of political appointees, a legacy of its early days when institutional flexibility was seen as an important element in the poverty war. So when the Phillips aides attempted to destroy the agency, these same political posts were at their disposal. In the summer of 1973, the Civil Service Commission found that nearly 30 of the Schedule C appointments that Phillips made went to people who were either unqualified or in "unjustifiable" jobs. That same summer, federal court orders halted Phillips' heavy-handed attack on the agency. His successor, Alvin Arnett, was in turn deposed in July 1974 by a group of right-wing political appointees who claimed that he was too liberal. Arnett said at the time that these political appointees had been taken from a White House "must-hire" list. "They only served on paper. They almost never did anything. They just got paid." Representatives of the American Federation of Government Employees claim that political clearance still continues at OEO.

HUD provides another example of political favoritism at work. One of the fastest-moving HUD officials is Robert Odle, the meek-voiced *naif* who led off the Watergate hearings. The former CREEP officer, a mere 30 years old, started work at HUD as a $120-a-day consultant in housing management. He was soon made a political GS-16 at $32,000, and after a few months' experience was promoted to a $36,000 job as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Housing Management. Another fortunate CREEP veteran is Rick Fore, a field director for the Nixon campaign, who was a GS-15 special assistant in the "new communities program." He was recently promoted to a GS-16 position as the executive assistant to the general manager of the program.

Where it Hurts

In all the various investigations of the Malek-Nixon system, the focus has been on favoritism, not the damaging impact on the workings of the bureaucracy. It is worth remembering that favoritism and political clearance affects us in ways besides the waste of public funds. There is an inevitable decline in standards that will even-

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tually have an impact on our lives.

A good example is a study by the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee's investigations subcommittee. In a March 1974 report it found recruitment abuses in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. One affects auto safety, the other the quality and efficiency of justice. The report said, "There is convincing evidence of favoritism, pre-selection, tailored requirements and selective factors, questionable qualifications and experience—all to the detriment of other qualified applicants who may have been laboring under the misapprehension that there was a good probability that they would gain federal employment, while in reality they had little or no chance." Of 30 name requests during 1971 and 1972, the subcommittee found abuses in 18 of the cases.

A NHTSA engineer, a government employee for 30 years, told me, "What's going on is the degradation of the merit system. The entire civil service system is threatened." In his division, favoritism was shown toward former employees of North American Rockwell, a company that manufactures some of the parts tested by the division. We can only speculate about the effect this brazen conflict of interest must have had on the quality of inspections.

A more chilling example of improper political influence comes from one of the answers prepared by agency directors under the 1972 "Responsiveness Plan." George Guenther, former Assistant Secretary for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), wrote in a June 1972 memo of the ways he could use his agency to help the President's reelection. Established in 1971, OSHA is supposed to help prevent industrial accidents and disease, and is one of the few new creations of the Nixon Administration. Unlike most regulatory agencies, which go through a brief period of vigorous enforcement before becoming a captive of special interests, OSHA sold out from the moment of its inception. In only a few years, it has managed to rival the Interstate Commerce Commission in ineffectiveness. Among the "action" programs Guenther proposed:

† "While promulgation and modification activity must continue, no highly controversial standards (i.e., cotton dust, etc.) will be proposed by OSHA or by NIOSH [National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health]."

† "While the activities of the Standards Advisory Committee on Agriculture will commence in July, the Committee will concentrate on priorities and long-range planning, rather than on specific standards setting during this period."

Guenther's "personnel" plan:

"We are drafting an outline of OSHA's recruiting and hiring plan for the next six months. Subject to your approval, it is our intention to provide copies of this detailed plan to the Republican National Committee and the Committee to Re-elect the President. We can then consider applicants they propose."

He also asked for consideration of "the great potential of OSHA as a sales point for fund-raising and general support by employers."

Protecting the Worker

All the assorted outrages raise important questions about the Civil Service Commission's role in the patronage scandals and its ability to prevent such abuses. The Commission has already conducted several investigations and proposed disciplinary actions. It has required agencies to more thoroughly justify a "name request" candidate and to provide documentation of the extent of recruitment. Some agencies have taken corrective action, ranging from a hiring freeze to case reviews.

And, starting in December 1973, Civil Service Commission Chairman

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Robert Hampton tried three times to get President Nixon to issue a directive condemning violations of the civil service laws and merit system but was rebuffed each time. Hampton's December 1973 memo to Nixon mentioned the GSA referral unit, and two memos in 1974 added similar information about HUD and the Small Business Administration. In September, President Ford issued a memorandum to agency and department heads expressing his determination that the merit principles in the Civil Service Act and personnel regulations be carried out. Commission officials contend that the memorandum will play an important role in curbing abuses and setting high leadership standards, but others are not sure. The impact of President Ford's message is yet to be seen.

Are these actions enough?

The Commission has been attacked for not starting the first referral unit probe until June 1973 and for delaying disciplinary action. So far, a few people have resigned, but no one has been punished. Commission officials respond that they were unable to pin down specific allegations until late 1973, and that due process must in all cases be respected.

But it was only in the summer of 1974, after Nixon was clearly on the ropes, that the bulk of the Civil Service Commission investigations was concluded. The 1973 GSA study was virtually forced on them when the Commission was presented with a pile of affidavits by some GSA regional officials. And then there is the larger problem of how the Commission could fail to spot the most massive illegal patronage system in American history. Placement of political hacks was systematic, formalized, and copiously documented by internal memos. Executive director Bernard Rosen claims that the Commission showed "institutional courage" in launching its investigations, but it appears rather that the Commission failed to 1) encourage insiders to blow the whistle on the operation and 2) move swiftly to initiate its studies. In almost all cases, it allowed internal departmental audits to take place before it stepped in.

A recent GAO study attacked the Commission for the inadequacy of its personnel management evaluations. It said the Commission was too tied to the agencies it monitors. It blamed in part the strong emphasis placed on obtaining agency cooperation and the willingness of the Commission to accept empty promises of bureaucratic reform. The study said, "Our review of 23 CSC overview reports issued during fiscal 1972 and 1973 disclosed that only four commented on previous findings and recommendations." The GAO also said the Commission sometimes omits damaging regional findings in final reports.

The failure of the Commission to obtain a copy of the Malek manual until July is also disappointing, if not suspicious. Some say the staff was either incompetent or in collusion with Nixon aides. One reporter who covers the bureaucracy says, "I don't think the manual could have been completed without some CSC assistance."

The truth is that the information could have come from any of the old Roosevelt veterans or from hundreds of other reasonably sophisticated civil servants. The important question is not who is to blame—of course the Nixon people were more to blame—but what is to be done.

One obvious step is to make many more jobs available to each new administration to fill with people of its choice. The balance has tipped so far in favor of the civil service that new administrations do have a real problem in actually gaining the policy control they were elected to assert. The other is really to protect the remaining civil service employees so that there is no danger of dismissing, for example, the career employees in the Internal Revenue Service who refuse to do the dirty work of an H. R. Haldeman or to make way for the friend of a Chuck Colson. ■

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the political puzzle

by John Barclay



ACROSS

1. U. S. aid may help identify Arabia. (5)
4. Still calms troubled waters? (3)
6. Any caprice exacts toll in the end. (5)
9. To back up dollar, use freer coin. (9)
10. Bring up what is in cocked ear. (5)
11. Something fishy back in amoral times. (5)
12. Responding to grain news. (9)
13. Sleeping outside because of motor sound? (7)
14. There may be a wait to get mail. (4-3)
16. Country where there is, *inter alia*, proscription. (7)
19. Ruth and prisoner of war may make one sick. (5,2)
21. A thousandth and N. Y. time unit marks progress. (9)
23. Underneath many heros. (5)
25. This is one kind of pollution. (5)
26. Placed in the race and no time is arranged. (9)
27. Church gathering turns Syd on. (5)
28. Need help. Smelly oil ship will do for openers. (3)
29. Took a stand and dies 500 times over. (5)

DOWN

1. Home for Arab in uneasy Rialto dwelling. (5)
2. A touch of rum in service costume. (7)
3. Look for it on final economic blow-up. (9)
4. "Ug! Groan!" That's comedy fellows? (3,4)
5. Stealer looks bad today. (5,2)
6. Just pucker! That's super! (5)
7. Rearrange Roman two to get good start. (7)
8. Gay green pea epitomizes present shortage. (6,3)
13. Production of little seminal company will help fill 8 down. (9)
15. Purveyors of French ocean songs? (9)
17. It's ginable in the Low Countries. (7)
18. There's lots of atom limits? (7)
19. Mother's little helper for martinis. (7)
20. Fabric with inferiority complex. (7)
22. Get rid of money at Southern Pacific terminal. (5)
24. Finished, apprehended! (5)

The numbers indicate the number of letters and words, e.g., (2,3) means a two-letter word followed by a three-letter word. Groups of letters, e.g., USA are treated as one word. Answers to last month's puzzle are on page 38.

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SECTION F

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SPECIFICATIONS

1. Contractor will render only those services which are specified in the schedule. The services to be rendered, and the quality of performers furnished, shall be of high order and as approved by the Installation Club Manager.

2. Contractor shall not employ any person to perform any of the services required by this contract on the military installation if objection to any such person is made by the Installation Club System. Under no circumstances shall performers be deemed to be employees or agents of Installation Club System.

3. Contractor agrees to indemnify, save harmless and defend the Fund from and against any or all claims, demands, actions, debts, liabilities, judgements, costs and attorneys' fees arising out of, claimed on account of, or in any manner predicated upon loss of or damage to the property of and injuries to or the death of any and all persons whatsoever, in any manner caused or contributed to by contractor, its agents, servants, or employees while in, upon or about the military installation, while going to or departing from same and to indemnify and save harmless Fund from and on account of damages of any kind which Fund may suffer as the result of the acts of any of contrator's agents, servants, or employees in, upon or about said installation.

4. Changes to the schedule will be complied with when it is submitted two (2) work days prior to the day of performance.

5. Billing will be at an hourly rate, per person, for actual performance. Billing period is from the 26th of each month through the 25th of the following month.

6. Any dancer whose performance is deemed by the Installation Club Manager as unsatisfactory will not be rescheduled.

7. Special parties - Contractor will be given two (2) days advance notice prior to the day of performance.

8. Entertainers will perform continuously for thirty (30) minutes after which time a break of ten (10) minutes is permitted.

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STANDARDS OF ATTIRE AND CONDUCT
FOR
GO GO DANCERS

9. Standards of attire and conduct for Go Go Dancers within the Fort Hood Installation Club System are as follows:

a. ATTIRE

(1) Breasts will be covered at all times, Pasties do not afford acceptable cover. The pubic region will be covered to the degree afforded by a G-String.

(2) Dancers are forbidden to remove any articles of the acceptable minimal attire outlined in the preceding paragraph.

b. CONDUCT

(1) Dancers will be designated specific areas in clubs and annexes to be utilized for performances.

(2) Dancers will not sit at tables or at the bar with patrons. No. exception to this rule shall exist, including husbands, boyfriends, girlfriends, or family.

(3) Use of club facilities by dancers during non-working hours is forbidden except as a guest of a member.

(4) Dancers will enter and depart from clubs and annexes in proper street attire and, when not performing, will wear a robe or jacket in the clubs.

(5) Rest periods will be spent in the club manager's office, or at a table designated by the club manager where only the dancer is authorized to sit.

(6) Dancers will not report for work under the influence of drugs or alcoholic beverages nor will they partake of them during the hours for which they are scheduled to work.

(7) Dancers will arrive for work fifteen(15) minutes before the scheduled performance and report to the club manager as soon as they enter the club.

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Running for Congress The Secret Motives

by Walter Shapiro

It was "Wife Appreciation Night" at the Livonia, Michigan Jaycees. The featured speaker was the state Jaycee president, whose evangelistic style reinforced every liberal stereotype about the Junior Chamber of Commerce and Midwestern Babbitry. At one point he recited a bit of inspirational doggerel entitled "The Will to Win," and then urged the young businessmen of Livonia "to overcome the mediocrity that is within you." Turning to the tightly coiffed wives of the real estate brokers and insurance salesmen, the state president instructed these helpmates that "your task is to be an element in your husbands'—our fellow Jaycees'—development and growth."

I was there because the Jaycee meeting was to be followed by a candidates' forum, but throughout a dozen mind-numbing speeches by candidates for everything from U. S. Congress to county commissioner, I kept thinking about the Jaycees and their "development and growth." It was watching Bill Joyner, an obscure candidate for state representative, that helped me see the relationship between seeking public office and the Jaycee model of young men striving to get ahead. Joyner—yes, that's really his name—who has one of those cherubic faces that he had not yet outgrown at 24 or 25, is an officer of the local Jaycee chapter and an assistant to the local mayor, a minor politician who had run one losing race for lieutenant governor. As Joyner spoke for his allotted three minutes, I noticed that I was standing next to his young wife. She was intently following her husband's every word, one moment biting her lip, the next minute wringing her hands. Perhaps some day she may grow to lament the

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fate of political wives, but for those three minutes in Livonia, it was as if both her and her husband's lives depended on that one speech, that one campaign for state representative.

For most of us, job-hunting is an intense, but private, agony. For Bill Joyner, and the thousands like him seeking political office this year, the job-hunting is done in public, but the process is qualitatively the same. While some may regard the job of a state representative with the same fondness that W. C. Fields reserved for Philadelphia, few would doubt that becoming something like a U. S. congressman is a form of "making it" in America. True, two terms on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee may not have the same literary prestige as, say, four years at the helm of *Commentary*, but it does produce the kind of notoriety that is neither easily attained nor quickly forgotten.

This celebrity is an important factor in understanding what motivates people to run for Congress. While the editor of *Commentary* has concrete responsibilities, a freshman congressman has one of the most unstructured jobs in America. Since he can often get away with doing little more than answering quorum calls and voting, the motive generally ascribed to those who seek public office—the drive for power—seems strangely inappropriate. A number of prerogatives come with being a freshman congressman, but power—in the sense that an agency head in the federal, or even state, government has power—is not one of them.

Political campaigns are almost always presented to us as clashes over national issues or clear-cut tests of party loyalties. Later this month there will be laborious efforts to explain the mid-term congressional results in terms of the economy, the reaction to the Nixon pardon, the lingering

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residues of Watergate, and voter attitudes toward political reform. The flock of incoming congressmen will be scrutinized to divine the mood of the electorate and to pick out new faces to watch, much in the way that small boys scan minor league batting averages looking for the baseball stars of the future. But it is unlikely that much attention will be paid to what motivated these people to run for Congress or what their ascension to national office means to them personally.

These are not irrelevant questions. In the long run, attempts to delve into the character and the aspirations of newly elected congressmen are probably more important than analyzing their positions on abortion or gun control. Yet the conventions of political reporting dictate that questions like these are off-limits unless the congressman or senator becomes a serious presidential candidate. In a sense, trying to follow politics is like trying to understand the causes of inflation—you read so much and learn so little. This is unfortunate because a political campaign is often the best time to gauge the character of a future congressman, for once in office, self-images quickly change, public faces quickly harden.

There is an autobiographical reason why I am fascinated by what prompts people to run for Congress. Two years ago I sought the Democratic congressional nomination in the district where John Reuther is now the nominee and finished a respectably close second in a six-way primary. During my campaign I explained that I was running to express my outrage over the Vietnam war and the "to get along, go along" attitudes of most congressional incumbents. What I didn't discuss were the personal reasons behind my decision to make this long-shot race for Congress. In early 1972 my life was somewhat in disarray. Bored with graduate school and chastened by the effort to find a job in a recessionary economy, I calculated that I had everything to gain and nothing to lose by getting into politics. Putting it another way, others in my position might have gone into therapy, I ran for Congress.

Early in October, 1974, David Broder of *The Washington Post* gave Bob Carr, Jim Blanchard, and John Reuther, all young Michigan Democrats, a reasonable chance of winning Republican-held House seats. Carr made his first bid for public office in 1972 and came within 2,500 votes of defeating veteran Republican incumbent Charles Chamberlain in a district that is dominated by Lansing, but also includes Republican farming areas and the sprawling campus of Michigan State University (MSU). Chamberlain is retiring, and this year Carr is opposed by Charles Taylor, a conservative businessman. Both Blanchard and Reuther face the task of unseating Republican incumbents. Running in the militantly anti-busing suburbs north of Detroit, Blanchard is trying to oust conservative zealot Robert Huber, who was first elected to Congress in 1972. Reuther is opposing moderate Republican Marvin Esch in a diverse district that includes both Detroit suburbs and the extremely politicized university community of Ann Arbor. Carr and Reuther are considerably more liberal than Blanchard, but all three are stressing economic issues like unemployment, tax reform, and national health insurance in their campaigns. In early October I spent some time with Carr, Blanchard, and Reuther. My primary interest was not their chances in November or their attitudes toward congressional reform. Instead, I was seeking answers to far more personal and elusive questions.

Bob Carr: Almost a Congressman

Sitting in his tiny law office, now filled more with campaign research material than law books, Bob Carr displays the frustration of someone who is so close to being a congressman he can taste it, yet each morning has to come to grips with the reality that after 30 straight months of running for office, he is still just a candidate.

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At times Carr gives the impression that he senses he has lost control of the entire process: "I sometime feel like I'm part of a thing that is being acted out. In a way I have become more than just Bob Carr. Bob Carr has become a symbol to people who believe the same sort of things that I do."

The inexorable chain of events began in 1968 when Carr, who grew up in Wisconsin, came to the Lansing area on a Ford Foundation grant after a stint in Washington with Senator Gaylord Nelson. The grant involved working part-time with the Michigan legislature, and from there Carr drifted into the state attorney general's office, a Democratic bastion in a Republican state government. In 1971 Carr went into private practice in East Lansing, which he quickly abandoned for his first congressional race. As a political newcomer, Carr finessed the local Democrats so effectively that he was handed the congressional nomination without a primary. Despite the Nixon landslide, Carr's collegiate style and antiwar convictions had a strong appeal to the district's large student population, and he received 49.4 per cent of the vote in an agonizingly close election.

According to Carr's campaign literature, he announced his intention to run for Congress again the day after his 1972 defeat. Rather than demonstrating Carr's indomitable spirit, it suggests how depressing his alternatives were. His law practice was virtually nonexistent, and there is little evidence that Carr relished the idea of devoting the next 10 years to becoming East Lansing, Michigan's leading ACLU lawyer. Nor did a return to state government seem like an attractive possibility. Underlying Carr's attitudes about his two years in the state attorney general's office is the implication that he had little patience with the second-raters who gravitate to the periphery of state Democratic politics. And pride, an important element in unraveling Carr's complicated make-up, ruled out returning to Washington as anything less than a congressman.

When Chamberlain announced his retirement from Congress earlier this year, Carr recalled that he began to be regarded as the district's "non-incumbent incumbent" because of his close race in 1972. It is clear that in his own mind Carr no longer sees himself as just a candidate for Congress. He took great pains to tell me about the friendships he has made with House Democrats like Ed Mezvinsky, Les Aspin, and Gerry Studds. Similarly, Carr is proud that because of friendship, Tony Schwartz, considered by many to be the best in the business, is producing his radio commercials for half price—a still hefty $10,000. While I was with him, Carr received a call from the *Lansing State Journal* informing him that they planned to purchase two half-hour segments on local television for a debate between him and his opponent. Carr's immediate reaction was that he had been "screwed" by the Republican-oriented newspaper. Part of his anger was political because any joint debates would give exposure to his less well known opponent. But the vehemence of Carr's response almost suggested that he felt debating was beneath him since he was now the de facto incumbent. "Where were you two years ago when I wanted to debate Chamberlain?" Carr asked the newspaper official sarcastically.

The discrepancy between Carr's self-image and his status as merely a candidate seemed to be having an impact on his enthusiasm for campaigning. Greeting MSU students on their way to class, Carr looked so perfect with a Mark Spitz moustache and long, blue stadium coat that I half-expected Ali McGraw to yell, "Hey, preppie." But between handshakes, Carr confided that he was bored with the whole ritual, and he complained somewhat sourly that his staff expected him to do this kind of thing all day.

The same slightly acid tone crept into his voice when I mentioned that a

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voice on one of Tony Schwartz' radio commercials had a distinct New York accent. Carr laughed and said, "Out here they probably won't even recognize a New York accent." Some locals have begun to resent this kind of attitude. Unlike 1972, this year Carr faced primary opposition. Although he won with over 70 per cent of the vote, Carr admitted that the challenge represented the feeling by some East Lansing liberals that "I was aloof." Some degree of emotional estrangement from your constituents is inevitable after taking office, but with Carr, it seems to be happening while he is still a candidate.

While Carr's staff would like to see him constantly shaking hands, the candidate apparently wants to leave large gaps in his schedule for "office time." Part of this is devoted to the elaborate courtesies of political phone calls and the intricate machinations of campaign strategy. But he also seems to spend an inordinate amount of time refining his policy stands. There is a meticulousness about issues in the Carr campaign that is rare for a congressional race beyond the purview of a major newspaper. I saw it displayed when PIRGIM, a local Nader offshoot, issued a report detailing how the military budget causes economic dislocations in Michigan. Carr and several staff members went over the PIRGIM report carefully and mapped out a response that meshed these findings with Carr's own advocacy of a $14 billion cut in military spending.

The enthusiasm with which Carr dissected the PIRGIM report made it clear that he felt that this—and not campaigning—was the kind of work that he ought to be doing, that this was the job of a congressman. But all Carr really did was take one study written by someone else (in this case, an alternative defense budget prepared by the Center for Defense Analysis) and combine it with another (the PIRGIM report). It is striking how proud Carr is of the paraphernalia of this make-work, cerebral world. Showing me into his office, he pointed to two bound volumes of the *National Journal* as if they were his fondest possessions. Obviously, there is nothing wrong with taking pains to ensure that you have a solid factual base for your speeches and position papers. But Congress—and Washington as a whole—is full of well-intentioned people who have come to believe that producing meticulously detailed press releases really has a beneficial effect on peoples' lives.

Carr gives the impression that he has changed considerably in the 30 months he has been running for Congress. When he mentioned the need to go to Congress with "realistic expectations," he implied that he didn't have them in 1972. It is probable that a certain passion and a certain sense of mission has been lost in pursuit of these "realistic expectations." The driving force behind Carr now is his desire to take part in the debate, the rituals and the cloakroom conferences that come with being in Congress. Carr gave the game away when he said—in words that Blanchard and Reuther echoed—"It will be exciting to be in the 94th Congress. There will be more newer faces, more younger people than anytime since World War II." What Carr meant, in part, is that he relished the idea of joining the kind of company that was not available in a backwater like East Lansing. What keeps Carr going during the last month of his second congressional campaign is the belief that life on Capitol Hill would be infinitely more exciting than handling landlord-tenant disputes in a cubbyhole law office, two blocks from the Michigan State campus.

Blanchard: Out from Behind the Scenes

Sitting at the bar of the London Chop House in Detroit, I was talking about Jim Blanchard with a friend who had just begun covering Michigan politics for a local newspaper. The reporter, who considers Blanchard to be something of a lightweight,

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complained, "I can't understand why Blanchard has any more right to be in Congress than I do." I was somewhat surprised by my vehemence when I answered, "He's hungry for it, he's been willing to sacrifice for years to get it and you're not."

There are a dozen young men like Jim Blanchard in every state. They gravitate to prominent state politicians and manage their campaigns, write their speeches and carry their bags. In other states they might end up running a government department or handling legislative relations for a governor. But these prizes have been out of reach for Michigan Democrats since the rise of George Romney in 1962. That's why Jim Blanchard has had to content himself with five years in the state attorney general's office.

It is easy to understand the frustrations of someone like Blanchard who has been active, behind the scenes, in losing statewide races since his student days at Michigan State in the early 1960s. Talking with him at his campaign headquarters—a small, second-floor office at a grimy intersection, just a mile north of Detroit—it was apparent that he is keenly aware of his years in the political desert. "The generation of us between 30 and 35 is a special group of people," he said, gesturing to friends from state government who were helping with the campaign. "We represent a generation of people about to break through. We are a generation that was in college when John Kennedy was President. And that had a far greater effect on us than the Vietnam War. We're not the New Left, we're not angry young men. We grew up under presidents you could believe in, not Johnson and Nixon. We never grew up believing that politics is just war and assassination. That's why we'd like to restore the New Frontier, maybe mold it a little with populism, but we also recognize that things can't be that way again."

Someone who knew Blanchard in state government described him as "one of those people who talked constantly about how he would be governor of Michigan someday." It is easy to picture him much earlier, perhaps as a freshman at Michigan State, plotting his first political campaign. At the University of Michigan in 1965, I remember listening to a young politico like him counseling an ambitious freshman that he should enlist in the Green Berets "because a good war record is really important for a political career."

Blanchard decided the day after the 1972 election that this was going to be his year to finally run for office. He faced some large problems. Although raised in the district in which he was running, Blanchard had far better political connections in Lansing than he did at home. Thanks to a skillful primary campaign that was built around walking tours of the district, Blanchard narrowly won a four-way race to get the nomination. A major ingredient in Blanchard's upset victory was $30,000 he was loaned by his family. Blanchard denies that there is anything like a family fortune, although he admits, with a smile, that such rumors discouraged candidates from entering the primary. According to Blanchard, the son of a surgeon, the $30,000 represented a significant fraction of his family's cash reserves. It is easy to picture Blanchard asking for the money, much in the way another 31-year-old might borrow a similar sum to buy a piece of a new shopping center development.

Seeing Blanchard in a stark white raincoat with too many buckles, it is apparent that his candidacy would fail to go over in Ann Arbor, where John Reuther sports a blue blazer, or in East Lansing, where Bob Carr wears a corduroy suit and a red turtleneck sweater. Similarly, Blanchard was shocked when he went to Washington to try to get the endorsement of an environment group and discovered that they were more interested in his views on abortion (he's against it) than on the energy crisis. But Blanchard's clothes and his lack of concern for the pet issues of litmus-

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test liberals are assets in a district which is largely composed of white ethnics living in tract developments. It is also fitting that Blanchard is the only one of the three Michigan Democrats who is married and has a child.

It is disconcerting the way Blanchard freely admits his ignorance of many subjects. The Nader paperback, *Who Runs Congress?* is a major source of his knowledge about the inner workings of the office which he is seeking. Asked about his views on the defense budget, Blanchard replied, "So much about defense is classified, how can I speak intelligently?" Blanchard's lack of Washington sophistication masks an intuitive grasp of the kind of politics he did come in contact with when he worked in state government. His experiences in the attorney general's office provided him with a framework which he uses to generalize about other issues. For example, he stresses the need for independent congressional fact-finding because he has learned the hard way that a legislative body cannot depend on any bureaucracy to adequately assess its own performance. Once he becomes interested in a subject, Blanchard tends to go off on tangents, his syntax lagging far behind. Talking about congressional fact-finding, Blanchard suddenly began echoing Don Riegle's complaint that there are too many lawyers in Congress, although he himself is an attorney. Blanchard said the problem is that lawyers tend to think like abstract legalists, rather than administrators. "The only thing real in a lawsuit," said Blanchard, relishing the one-liner, "is getting a check after the settlement."

For all his diamond-in-the-rough qualities, there is no question that Blanchard is a driven man. His hunger meshes well with the insecurities of the second-generation ethnics who fill his congressional district, but his needs are somewhat different from theirs. What motivates Blanchard is a desire for recognition after years of working behind the scenes. This is linked with a desire for acceptance within Congress which is much stronger than his feelings about particular issues. "I doubt that you'll see Jim Blanchard as a crusader in Congress," he said, adopting the third person for the only time in the interview. "Jim Blanchard wants to be effective, to do the other is not in my nature." Money is also important to Blanchard, but it is something that he takes for granted. I asked him what he would be doing if he weren't running for Congress, and Blanchard responded without a moment's hesitation, "I'd be in private law practice, involved in politics as a hobby, and making lots of money."

Young Man Reuther

It is easy to mistakenly stereotype John (nephew of Walter, son of Victor) Reuther. Taking a Friday night flight from Washington to Detroit, I accidently found myself sitting behind Reuther and his campaign manager. They were talking about the segment they had filmed for the "Today" show and their three-minute appearance on John Chancellor earlier in the week. The whole thing seemed like an out-take from the movie "The Candidate" and both seemed perfect for their parts. Reuther, tall, hair brushed forward like a young Kennedy, slouched contentedly in his aisle seat. His campaign manager, hair greying at the temples, had a Frank Mankiewicz look, complete with a Brooks Brothers striped, button-down shirt.

The bare outlines of the situation seemed right for a Robert Redford movie. Reuther, heir to a famous labor name, moves into a Michigan congressional district in 1973 and gets a management job at Ford Motor Company. Less than a year later he is running for Congress with United Auto Workers' support, a Washington fund-raising party featuring Birch Bayh and a team of political professionals managing his campaign. As

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someone who ran in a Democratic primary in the same district with none of these advantages, it was very easy for me to develop the idea that the well-connected are different from you and I.

There was evidence that undermined this stereotype, but I tended to disregard it. For one thing, Reuther was welcomed by local Democrats with less than total enthusiasm. Rather than being handed the nomination, Reuther was thrown into a five-way primary in which he eked out a victory by less than 100 votes after a protracted recount. As for his professional campaign staff, I should have remembered watching them back in February demonstrate with elaborate over-laid maps of the congressional district that they had discovered where the large student vote was concentrated. It was, they announced with pride, in the precincts surrounding the University of Michigan campus.

This additional information did not destroy my preconception that young man Reuther was a hustler, it just suggested that he was somewhat inept at it. It took a full day campaigning with Reuther for me to realize that I was totally wrong. His congressional race was not prompted by greed or ambition, but rather motivated by a kind of insecurity and the hope that election to Congress would provide a focus that his life had thus far lacked. On a cold October afternoon, we had just finished a visit to a large apartment complex between Ypsilanti and Ann Arbor. As we headed back to the car, Reuther mentioned that his master's thesis was due at American University three days after the election. It was not said with the kind of arrogance of someone who has achieved success and now regards a master's degree as an irrelevant credential. Rather, the remark reflected the bemused anxiety of someone who was genuinely concerned about what would happen to him if he failed to get his degree and lost his bid for Congress.

The long-delayed master's thesis is somehow typical of John Reuther's first 30 years. Like Winston Churchill's pudding, his life lacks theme. After graduating from Cornell, Reuther worked for Birch Bayh and served on the congressional liaison staff of the OEO in the last days of the Johnson Administration. Then came two years in Russia, which came about when he was invited to study there by a delegation of Russian trade unionists he met in his uncle's home. Returning to the United States in 1970, Reuther took part in Teddy Kennedy's Senate campaign and then joined the staff of Birch Bayh's ill-fated presidential effort. When Bayh withdrew, Reuther went to the McGovern campaign, working in Massachusetts and Minnesota.

Reuther's primary interest outside of nuts-and-bolts politics is relations with the Soviet Union. But despite his fascination with the subject, he has little to say about Russia that would be unfamiliar to readers of *The New York Times* or a *Newsweek* cover story on Solzhenitsyn. His favorite story about his two years in the Soviet Union involves a drunken evening he and Birch Bayh spent with Soviet students in 1969 that climaxed with Bayh playing "Blowing in the Wind" on a borrowed guitar. According to Reuther, the students were very impressed that a United States senator would do something like that.

This predictability of outlook seems to spill over into his political views. His orientation is liberal, but listening to Reuther has all the suspense of reading a *New Republic* editorial. I asked Reuther who his models in Congress were, and all he came up with was a routine reference to Phil Hart's integrity. It's not that Reuther is unable to discuss issues intelligently (I heard him give a detailed presentation on the intricacies of national health insurance), it's just that there is no particular passion or originality to his point of view.

There is an unassuming air about

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Reuther, a basic modesty that is ingratiating personally, but rather deadly in a political candidate. The stories are legion about Reuther's natural tendency to gravitate to the nearest corner at political gatherings. Yet Reuther seems determined to make a success out of his political career. I asked what his plans were if he lost his congressional bid this year. If the election were close, Reuther said that he planned another race in 1976 when the incumbent, Marvin Esch, is rumored to be running for the Senate. If he were soundly defeated, Reuther said that he would try to work for a corporation that was active in trade with the Soviet Union.

One can argue that Reuther is almost doomed to a certain kind of frustration because of his family name and political connections. Those without either are eventually forced to make some difficult choices about career and aspirations before the age of 30. When you have a name like Reuther, you are often given far more latitude than the rest of us. Often this ability to be able to endure a series of long-shot gambles until one pays off is an important element in success, but sometimes this excess of freedom can be crippling. John Reuther's congressional campaign represents a kind of benchmark for him personally. It can be seen as a last desperate gamble, a last defiant gesture, before he settles for something ordinary or returns to a political patron like Birch Bayh.

Seduction and Betrayal

It is important to stress that these three Michigan Democrats are not villains, nor are they simply updated versions of Sammy Glick. In many ways they are among the most promising congressional candidates in the country. Each of them is unquestionably preferable to his opponent in this month's election. Both Carr and Reuther have the potential to be among the most liberal members of Congress. And Blanchard has a certain intuitive understanding of government that distinguishes him from most other anti-abortion, anti-busing Democrats.

It is difficult, and slightly distasteful personally, to delve into the psyches of these likeable people, especially since my own motivations for running for Congress in 1972 were qualitatively little different from theirs. But the exercise is important if we are ever to realistically understand—and thus evaluate—the people who purport to represent us in Washington.

Although the factors that prompted Carr, Blanchard, and Reuther to run for Congress are different, none of them displays any sense of mission about why they want to go to Washington. Their collective goal is to be congressmen, rather than to do anything specific in Congress. Carr talks about going to Washington with "realistic expectations" and Blanchard promises that he won't be a "crusader." What this means is that each is apt to measure his own success on the basis of how readily he is accepted by his colleagues, rather than on the basis of whether his work has an impact on anyone's life. There is an illusionary air to life on Capitol Hill, and it is easy for a congressman to believe that he is doing important work when he is merely issuing press releases, making speeches to disinterested audiences, and racing from one ill-focused committee hearing to another. That's why it is so important to send legislators to Washington who won't be seduced by the rituals of just being a congressman. ■

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

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political book notes

Public affairs books to be published in November.

America After Nixon. Robert Scheer. McGraw-Hill. The title is a come-on—the book is really motivated by Scheer's passionate hatred of the multinational corporations. There are all kinds of insufferable problems—a bit of a conspiracy outlook toward the multinational corporations, a fawning view of China, and a picture of the Arabs as brothers of the Third World. But with all his faults, Scheer sees something many proponents of the new age of scarcity don't. Instead of the beautiful world of bicycles and homegrown vegetables, he tells us that there are many powerful men and institutions with a great stake in preserving their power, and that they will not shirk from destroying us all rather than relinquish their profits and growth. A valuable antidote to the Udall book noted below.

Against the Law. Leonard W. Levy. Harper & Row, $12.50.

Big Brother and the Holding Company: The World Behind Watergate. Steve Weissman, ed. Ramparts, $10.00, $3.45. This collection is for people who haven't kept up with the radical press in recent years. With varying degrees of credibility, the authors attempt to show that Nixon was tied to Mafia hoodlums, corporate swindlers and low-life snoopers. Chuck Colson is the prime target of many of the articles as, among other things, the alleged mastermind of an attempted paramilitary coup and of the Wallace shooting.

Big Business. C. Northcote Parkinson. Little, Brown, $9.95. The author's usual amusing comments about corporate culture are accompanied by this important, if unfashionable, insight: "Any reconciliation. . . of big business and government can take only one form: a more international form of government."

The Common Millionaire: And How to Get That Way. Robert Heller. Delacorte, $8.95. This is the story of how the rich get that

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way and stay that way—at the expense of the rest of us. The author underestimates the virtues but certainly not the sins of entrepreneurship.

The Corporate Conscience. David F. Linowes. Hawthorn. An earnest effort to work out some sort of social audit of corporate affairs. The resulting "Socio-Economic Operating Statement" seems ridiculous at times, but it is nevertheless a first step in a journey that corporations must undertake.

Du Pont: Behind the Nylon Curtain. Gerard Colby Zilg. Prentice-Hall, $12.95.

The Energy Balloon. Stewart Udall, Charles N. Conconi, David E. Osterhout. McGraw-Hill, $7.95. Don't be put off by all the tough-guy talk at the beginning of this book. It is really a sweet, optimistic view of the future, where the corporations serve the public good, everyone rides bicycles, and people live in wonderful, close-knit communities. All we need to do to bring this state into being is to realize that the energy crisis is real and to recreate our society to take into account that new fact. Udall et al. don't spend much time telling us how to bring this about. It is enough, they seem to say, to paint a pretty picture of the new world. The fact that not everyone may share the same vision or that it will threaten the vital interests of many important groups is conveniently brushed over.

Expropriation Politics. Jessica Pernitz Einhorn. Lexington. A tedious study of bureaucratic infighting over U. S. policy on overseas expropriations. The government's failure to invoke sanctions against Peru in 1969 is contrasted with a new get-tough stance in 1972. The author credits State Department influence in Latin American affairs for the earlier, more moderate decision, and Treasury-State bickering for the new policy. The turf-protecting motivations of government officials are examined closely, without the faintest indication that the author is writing about human beings. The book is based on a doctoral dissertation, and reinforces the belief that the average thesis shouldn't be published.

If You Have a Lemon Make Lemonade. Warren Hinckle. Putnam's, $8.95. An entertaining account of life at *Ramparts* by its former editor.

The Glory and the Dream: A Narrative History of America, 1932-1972. William Manchester. Little, Brown, $20. An absorbing, often even exciting, account of the last 40 years marred—in the galleys at least—by too many errors of fact.

Henry Kissinger: The Private and Public

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Story. Ralph Blumenfeld. New American Library, $1.75.

Herblock Special Report. Herbert Block. Norton, 7.95.

How Much for Health? Warren G. Magnuson, Elliot A. Segal. R. B. Luce, $7.95.

Just Between Us Blacks. Carl T. Rowan. Random House, $5.95.

Mandatory Motherhood: The True Meaning of "Right to Life." Garrett Hardin. Beacon Press, $4.95, $1.95.

The Organization Trap and How to Get Out of It. Samuel A. Culbert. Basic. This is a good book about a crucially important subject. Unfortunately, however, the author is partial to this kind of prose: "First we identify the assumptions that characterize our interaction with the organization system. Second, we contrast these assumptions against current experience and newly acquired insights to see if they fit. If they do, we can validate our existing picture of reality."

Partial Justice. Willard Gaylin. Alfred A. Knopf. Gaylin is a psychoanalyst who interviewed several dozen judges for this book. His purpose was to understand why punishment for similar crimes varies so dramatically from case to case and court to court. The book is level-headed and insightful, and highlights the shot-in-the-dark nature of most judges' sentencing philosophy.

Political Corruption: Prelude to Watergate. Joan Joseph Levy, Gerald Leinwald, eds. Pocket, $.95.

The Politics of City Revenue. Arnold J. Meltsner. Univ. of California, $2.85.

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Undercover: Memoirs of an American Secret Agent. E. Howard Hunt. Putnam's, $8.95.

Victimless Crimes: Two Sides of a Controversy. Edwin M. Schur, Hugo Bedau. Prentice-Hall, $6.95, $2.45.

Who Controls the Mass Media? Martin H. Seiden. Basic.

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